42 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION
who voted for its acceptance. It also heartened the alien
business community which had nearly despaired of American
protection. The Platt Amendment also reflected a prevalent
belief in Washington that further direct tutelage would be
fruitless and might create violent resistance to the Military
Government. It, too, articulated a national disillusionment with
the burdens of colonial administration as well as the ful
filment of a promise to Cuba. In the future the United States
would not attempt to change Cuban behavior; it would,
instead, deal with Cuba, government-to-government, as na
tional interest (in terms of security and economic gain)
dictated. The Platt Amendment was designed to give the
United States a maximum influence on the Cuban govern
ment with a minimum of responsibility for the character of
Cuban life.
In Cuba there was some protest against those articles (II,
IV, and V) drafted to protect the work of the Military Govern
ment, but the greatest outcry was against the amendment as a
whole and Article III specifically. To allay Cuban fears, Elihu
Root, during discussion with a Cuban delegation in Wash
ington, stated that Article III did not sanction intervention
in Cuban domestic affairs. It was simply an extension of the
Monroe Doctrine by treaty. There would be no "intermeddling
or intervention in any manner" in internal affairs. Root, how
ever, added the proviso, which he repeated for Domingo
Mendez Capote, that the United States might intervene "when
there may exist a true state of anarchy within the Republic."
42
Senator Joseph B. Foraker's analysis of the effects of the
Platt Amendment was more far-sighted. During the Senate
debate, he predicted that Article III might bring about the
intervention it was supposed to deter. America's pledge to
guarantee Cuban peace would work to the advantage of
the political "outs," for they might nullify any election by
rising in rebellion and force the United States to intervene.^43
A similar view was held by the noted British political com
mentator and statesman, James Bryce. He believed that any
interpretation of Article III less strict than Roofs could lead