The Politics of Intervention

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44 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION


rested on their avoidance of Cuban politics. Ironically, the
administration, which Wood hoped would show the Cubans
the best of the American political tradition, was best remem­
bered for the efficiency of its highly personalist rule. Wood
gave Cuba the "effective tyranny" that Spain had failed
to provide.
The Military Government left Cuba several legacies. In
its three years of operation it gave many Cubans the vision
of what American occupation meant: an end to violence,
better health, justice, and economic growth, all at the price
of Cuban political independence and Hispanic culture. It is
no wonder that Cubans viewed the United States with a
mixture of hope and fear. On the other hand, despite Wood's
reforms, the American government no longer accepted re­
sponsibility for institutional changes within Cuba. To this
degree Cuba was independent. The United States, however,
placed restrictions upon the Cuban government that further
weakened its limited ability and will to deal with Cuba's
problems. All these factors contributed to the political develop­
ments that led to the Second Intervention.


The Politics of Faction, 1900-1906


While the Army administered Cuba, the leading figures of
the independence movement formed political organizations to
contend in the promised elections. These organizations were
based on personal and regional loyalties.^46 At the time of the
municipal elections in June, 1900, three major factions ap­
peared. The two largest groups, the Nationalists and Federal
Republicans, were dominated by Cuban veterans. The Nation­
alists were identified by their co-operation with the Military
Government at the national level. They were men from
Havana or the western provinces, supported by Maximo
Gomez. They claimed to favor a strong central government.
The Federal Republicans represented the interests of Santa
Clara and its civil governor, a former insurgent general, Jose
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