The August Revolution 69American support, under the terms of Article III of the
Platt Amendment, in the case of open rebellion against their
regime.^32 The government's reasoning probably followed that
of an article written by Enrique Jose Varona on August 31.
Cuba's foremost author and political philosopher believed the
Platt Amendment promised support only to a de jure govern
ment, "... to aid, consequently, the present government.
To proceed in another way would be to reopen the thorny
Cuban problem; and that does not suit the administration in
Washington, and enters now neither in the preoccupations,
nor in the interests of the people of the United States."^33
Yet the United States appeared reluctant to offer aid, and
the American charge, Jacob Sleeper, did little more than carp
about the lack of protection for foreign property.
The Cuban people themselves found the government's
embarrassment amusing. In the countryside the campesinos
were reveling in the anti-authoritarian spirit of the moment.
The government's militiamen were enjoying their good wages
and were reluctant to risk not being able to spend their dol
lars. They suspected the Foreign Legion of Artillery with its
machine guns was much too eager for combat. As for the
habanero, he too feared a fight. A reporter asked one busi
nessman why there was no cheering when the government
forces shuffled unwillingly out of Havana. "Why should I
cheer," the merchant replied. "They are getting two dollars
a day, American, besides fifty cents for food. And when it
is all over we pay, you and I. For my part, I don't see why
there must be all this fighting. There will be more elections
some day. And if they fight very long, business will be
ruined."^34 Yet the government recognized that an American
intervention would be distasteful to many Cubans and po
litically perilous for those who invited it, and if it could
avoid at least the stigma of intervention that would be a
major victory.^35
On September 1, the Cuban situation was tangled, but
some important generalizations should be made at this point.
First, the insurgents were out in large enough numbers to
cause the havoc promised, but as yet they had destroyed