Preface
I
N THE YEARS immediately following the
Spanish-American War, the realities of Cuban
independence weighed heavily on the United States. In Sep
tember, 1906, as the result of an insurrection in Cuba, Theodore
Roosevelt, citing his responsibilities to Cuba under the Platt
Amendment, intervened to end the war and reluctantly as
sumed direct control of the Cuban government. Five thousand
American troops occupied the island. Until the occupation
ended in 1909, the American government attempted to restore
the pre-revolt political alignment, although the intervention
and occupation had made such a restoration impossible. This
policy was determined by some factors that had little relation
to Cuban political life: recent civil and military experiences
in the Philippines and the public reaction to them, the Ameri
can presumption that the occupation was temporary, American
assumptions about the efficacy of political parties as a mode
of political expression, and the Roosevelt administration's con
clusion that popular elections were essential to stable and
legitimate government.
Political and economic influence in one form or another
was the historic state of relations between the United States
and Cuba. Constitutionalized as the right of intervention after
1898, this relationship became the promise of active political
and administrative control of Cuba by the United States under
certain conditions which might threaten Cuba's independence.
It was assumed that the United States would be the initiator
of such action. The possibility of intervention, however, as
pledged in the organic law of both countries was a constant