74 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION
three provinces, arrested more Liberals, rescinded its amnesty
order, renewed military operations, put Havana under a cur
few, and rejected the veterans' peace plan.^53 A representative
of the veterans in the field, Colonel Gerardo Machado, re
ported to Menocal that the Rural Guard and militia had just
killed some prisoners; Machado and other veterans then
joined the Constitutional Army.^54 Menocal, who had believed
that Estrada Palma had overcome the Moderates' objections
to compromise, now found the President unwilling to negoti
ate "... though we were ignorant of the causes that could
have brought about such a radical and unexpected change in
the President's attitude." The veterans recognized that Estrada
Palma's new militancy was an insurmountable obstacle to
settlement and broke off negotiations.^55
The results of Estrada Palma's new interest in prosecuting
the war were increased insurgent attacks, dynamitings of
British railroad properties and rumors of sugar property
burnings.^56 Steinhart's cables showed how rapidly the situa
tion deteriorated. In his first wire on September 12, he
believed diplomatic pressure might end the rebellion; by
that afternoon he was forwarding a request from Estrada
Palma for two or three thousand troops to prevent a massacre
in Havana.
57
It was into this tense and unpredictable situa
tion that Roosevelt's two warships sailed, without restrictive
instructions, and it was at this moment that the President's
hope for peace through persuasion was dashed completely
through events in Cuba.
The United States Navy IntervenesOn the afternoon of September 12, the cruiser "Denver"
steamed into Havana harbor and anchored off O'Reilly and
Obispo streets with its guns cleared for action. The Americans
in the watching crowd cheered, the Cubans were silent and
scowling.^58 The city itself, its low white buildings with red
tile roofs stretching off in the smoke and haze of the Cuban
afternoon, was peaceful. In the harbor the smells of tar, fish,