Feist−Feist: Theories of
Personality, Seventh
EditionIII. Humanistic/Existential
Theories- May: Existential
Psychology
(^374) © The McGraw−Hill
Companies, 2009
368 Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories
pointed to the sterility of conventional scientific methods and their inability to un-
lock the ontological character of willing, caring, and acting human beings.
May held that a new scientific psychology must recognize such human char-
acteristics as uniqueness, personal freedom, destiny, phenomenological experiences,
and especially our capacity to relate to ourselves as both object and subject. A new
science of humans must also include ethics. “The actions of living, self-aware human
beings are never automatic, but involve some weighing of consequences, some po-
tentiality for good or ill” (May, 1967, p. 199).
Until this new science acquires greater maturity, we must evaluate May’s views
by the same criteria used for each of the other personality theorists. First, have May’s
ideas generated scientific research? May did not formulate his views in a theoretical
structure, and a paucity of hypotheses is suggested by his writings. Some research,
such as Jeff Greenberg and associates’ investigations on terror management, relates
generally to existential psychology, but these studies do not specifically flow from
May’s theory. On this first criterion of a useful theory, therefore, May’s existential
psychology receives a very low score.
Second, can May’s ideas be verified or falsified? Again, existential psychology
in general and May’s theory in particular must be rated very low on this criterion.
The theory is too amorphous to suggest specific hypotheses that could either confirm
or disconfirm its major concepts.
Third, does May’s philosophically oriented psychology help organize what is
currently known about human nature?On this criterion, May would receive an aver-
age rating. Compared with most theorists discussed in this book, May has more
closely followed Gordon Allport’s dictum, “Do not forget what you have decided to
neglect” (Allport, 1968, p. 23). May did not forget that he excluded discourses on
developmental stages, basic motivational forces, and other factors that tend to seg-
ment the human experience. May’s philosophical writings have reached deep into the
far recesses of the human experience and have explored aspects of humanity not ex-
amined by other personality theorists. His popularity has been due in part to his abil-
ity to touch individual readers, to connect with their humanity. Although his ideas
may affect people in ways that other theorists do not, his use of certain concepts was
at times inconsistent and confusing. Moreover, he decided to neglect several impor-
tant topics in human personality: for example, development, cognition, learning, and
motivation.
As a practical guide to action,May’s theory is quite weak. Although he
possessed a keen understanding of human personality, May gathered his views
more from philosophical than from scientific sources. In fact, he had no objection
to being called a philosopher and frequently referred to himself as a philosopher-
therapist.
On the criterion of internal consistency,May’s existential psychology again
falls short. He offered a variety of definitions for such concepts as anxiety, guilt, in-
tentionality, will, and destiny. Unfortunately, he never presented operational defini-
tions of these terms. This imprecise terminology has contributed to the lack of re-
search on May’s ideas.
The final criterion of a useful theory is parsimony,and on this standard, May’s
psychology receives a moderate rating. His writings at times were cumbersome and
awkward, but to his credit, he dealt with complex issues and did not attempt to over-
simplify human personality.