Feist−Feist: Theories of
Personality, Seventh
EditionIV. Dispositional Theories 13. Allport: Psychology of
the Individual(^392) © The McGraw−Hill
Companies, 2009
others propriate; and some are tension reducing, others tension maintaining.
Motives that appear to be different really are different, not only in form but
also in substance.
- “It will ascribe dynamic force to cognitive processes—e.g., to planning and
intention” (Allport, 1961, p. 222). Allport argued that most people are busy
living their lives into the future, but that many psychological theories are
“busy tracing these lives backward into the past. And while it seems to each
of us that we are spontaneously active,many psychologists are telling us
that we are only reactive” (p. 206). Although intention is involved in all
motivation, this third requirement refers more generally to long-range
intention. A young woman declines an offer to see a movie because she
prefersto study anatomy. This preference is consistent with her purposeof
making good grades at college and relates to her plansof being admitted to
medical school, which is necessary in order for her to fulfill her intentionof
being a doctor. The lives of healthy adults are future oriented, involving
preferences, purposes, plans, and intentions. These processes, of course, are
not always completely rational, as when people allow their anger to dominate
their plans and intentions. - An adequate theory of motivation is one that “will allow for the concrete
uniqueness of motives”(Allport, 1961, p. 225). A concrete unique motive is
different from an abstract generalized one, the latter being based on a
preexistent theory rather than the actual motivation of a real person. An
example of a concrete unique motive is Derrick, who is interested in
improving his bowling game. His motive is concrete, and his manner of
seeking improvement is unique to him. Some theories of motivation may
ascribe Derrick’s behavior to an aggressive need, others to an inhibited
sexual drive, and still others to a secondary drive learned on the basis of a
primary drive. Allport would simply say that Derrick wants to improve his
bowling game because he wants to improve his bowling game. This is
Derrick’s unique, concrete, and functionally autonomous motive.
In summary, a functionally autonomous motive is contemporary and self-
sustaining; it grows out of an earlier motive but is functionally independent of it. All-
port (1961) defined functional autonomy as “any acquired system of motivation in
which the tensions involved are not of the same kind as the antecedent tensions from
which the acquired system developed”(p. 229). In other words, what begins as one
motive may grow into a new one that is historically continuous with the original but
functionally autonomous from it. For example, a person may originally plant a gar-
den to satisfy a hunger drive but eventually become interested in gardening for its
own sake.
Perseverative Functional Autonomy
The more elementary of the two levels of functional autonomy is perseverative
functional autonomy.Allport borrowed this term from the word “perseveration,”
which is the tendency of an impression to leave an influence on subsequent experi-
ence. Perseverative functional autonomy is found in animals as well as humans and
is based on simple neurological principles. An example of perseverative functional386 Part IV Dispositional Theories