Feist−Feist: Theories of
Personality, Seventh
EditionV. Learning Theories 15. Skinner: Behavioral
Analysis© The McGraw−Hill^465
Companies, 2009ary history and also with the contingencies of reinforcement. “People do not observe
particular practices in order that the group will be more likely to survive; they ob-
serve them because groups that induced their members to do so survived and trans-
mitted them” (Skinner, 1987a, p. 57). In other words, humans do not make a coop-
erative decision to do what is best for the society, but those societies whose members
behaved cooperatively tended to survive.
Cultural practices such as toolmaking and verbal behavior began when
an individual was reinforced for using a tool or uttering a distinctive sound. Eventu-
ally, a cultural practice evolved that was reinforcing to the group, although not
necessarily to the individual. Both toolmaking and verbal behavior have survival
value for a group, but few people now make tools and even fewer invent new
languages.
The remnants of culture, like those of natural selection, are not all adaptive.
For example, the division of labor that evolved from the Industrial Revolution
has helped society produce more goods, but it has led to work that is no longer
directly reinforcing. Another example is warfare, which in the preindustrialized
world benefited certain societies, but which now has evolved as a threat to human
existence.
Inner States
Although he rejected explanations of behavior founded on nonobservable hypothet-
ical constructs, Skinner (1989b) did not deny the existence of internal states, such as
feelings of love, anxiety, or fear. Internal states can be studied just as any other be-
havior, but their observation is, of course, limited. In a personal communication of
June 13, 1983, Skinner wrote, “I believe it is possible to talk about private events
and, in particular, to establish the limits with which we do so accurately. I think this
brings so-called ‘nonobservables’ within reach.” What, then, is the role of such inner
states as self-awareness, drives, emotions, and purpose?
Self-Awareness
Skinner (1974) believed that humans not only have consciousness but are also aware
of their consciousness; they are not only aware of their environment but are also
aware of themselves as part of their environment; they not only observe external
stimuli but are also aware of themselves observing that stimuli.
Behavior is a function of the environment, and part of that environment is
within one’s skin. This portion of the universe is peculiarly one’s own and is there-
fore private. Each person is subjectively aware of his or her own thoughts, feelings,
recollections, and intentions. Self-awareness and private events can be illustrated by
the following example. A worker reports to a friend, “I was so frustrated today that
I almost quit my job.” What can be made of such a statement? First, the report itself
is verbal behavior and, as such, can be studied in the same way as other behaviors.
Second, the statement that she was on the verge of quitting her job refers to a non-
behavior. Responses never emitted are not responses and, of course, have no mean-
ing to the scientific analysis of behavior. Third, a private event transpired “within the
skin” of the worker. This private event, along with her verbal report to the friend, can
be scientifically analyzed. At the time that the worker felt like quitting, she might
Chapter 15 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 459