Feist−Feist: Theories of
Personality, Seventh
EditionII. Psychodynamic
Theories(^60) 2. Freud: Psychoanalysis © The McGraw−Hill
Companies, 2009
not compelling, case for their integration. We have reviewed some of the empirical
evidence for unconscious mental processing, the id and the pleasure principle and
the ego and the reality principle, repression and defense mechanisms, and dreams.
Unconscious Mental Processing
Many scientists and philosophers have recognized two different forms of conscious-
ness. First is the state of not being aware or awake, and second is the state of being
aware. The former is referred to as “core consciousness,” whereas the latter is re-
ferred to as “extended consciousness.” The brain stem, and the ascending activating
system in particular, is the part of the brain most directly associated with core con-
sciousness, or unconsciousness in the sense of not being awake. For instance, comas
come from damage to this region of the brain stem and render a person unconscious.
In contrast, being aware and able to reflect on one’s knowledge and self is more a
function of activity in the prefrontal cortex (the dorsal frontal cortex) (Solms, 2004;
Solms & Turnbull, 2002).
Moreover, a major theme of cognitive psychology over the last 20 years has
been the phenomenon of nonconscious mental processing, or what is referred to as
“implicit,” “nonconscious,” or “automatic” thought and memory (Bargh & Chartrand,
1999; Schacter, 1987). By this, cognitive psychologists are referring to mental
processes that are neither in awareness nor under intentional control, and thereby
come close to Freud’s definition of unconscious. Of course, Freud’s concept of the
unconscious was more dynamic, repressive, and inhibiting, but—as we see next—
cognitive neuroscience is uncovering a similar kind of unconscious.
Pleasure and the Id: Inhibition and the Ego
Findings from many different neuroscientific programs of research have established
that the pleasure-seeking drives have their neurological origins in two brain structures,
namely the brain stem and the limbic system (Solms, 2004; Solms & Turnbull, 2002).
Moreover, the neurotransmitter dopamine is most centrally involved in most pleasure-
seeking behaviors. In Freud’s language, these are the drives and instincts of the id.
In 1923, when Freud modified his view of how the mind works and proposed
the structural view of id, ego, and superego, the ego became a structure that was
mostly unconscious, but whose main function was to inhibit drives. If the part of the
brain that functions to inhibit impulses and drives is damaged, we should see an in-
crease in the id-based pleasure-seeking impulses. That is precisely what happens
when the frontal-limbic system is damaged. Many case studies and more systematic
brain-imaging research have demonstrated the connection between the frontal-limbic
system and impulse regulation (Chow & Cummings, 1999; Pincus, 2001; Raine,
Buchsbaum, & LaCasse, 1997). The first reported and best-known case of this was
the 19th-century railroad worker Phineas Gage. While working on the railroad, an
explosion caused a metal rod to shoot upward and through the bottom of his jaw up
and out the top of his forehead, damaging his frontal lobes. Amazingly, perhaps
because the speed of the rod cauterized brain tissue, Gage never lost consciousness
and survived. Physically (except for loss of brain tissue) he was relatively fine, but
his personality changed. By all accounts, this rather mild-mannered, responsible, and
reliable worker became, in the words of his doctor, “fitful, irreverent, indulging at
times in the grossest profanity (which was not previously his custom), manifesting
54 Part II Psychodynamic Theories