ȁȁȅ Partʺ: Economicsexperienced some badgering myself ). I have heard all too much praise of
methodological articles that did not rise above pointless profundity.ȁ
Some economists, then, though a minority, are fascinated with meth-
odology. Why? Could they be delighted with their own breadth of learn-
ing, as in epistemology and the philosophy of science? Could they believe
that such profundity and wisdom must have great significance, somehow,
for their own field? Perhaps it helps make a splash to propose import-
ing into economics, even without reference to any genuine questions or
problems, ideas and techniques lifted from other fields. Examples include
notions of Newtonian and Bergsonian time, concepts of hermeneutics,
psychological notions, and mathematical techniques from engineering.
Far be it from me to taboo such borrowings, but the test should be
not whether they confer a supposed cachet on the borrowers but whether
they further genuine investigations. Nor do I want to lecture methodolo-
gists against the pleasure of wallowing in their favorite profundities—not
unless they expect other people admiringly to join in.
Methodologists get a handle on other people as teachers, dissertation
supervisors, journal editors and referees, conference organizers, partici-
pants in tenure and promotion decisions, writers of letters of recommen-
dation, and members of fellowship and research committees. People in
such roles almost necessarily issue advice or apply requirements. Ļose
people may deserve some advice in turn, even though it may sound like
methodology itself.
Donald McCloskey (ȀȈȇȄ, esp. pp.ȁȃ–ȁȅ) distinguishes three levels
of methodology. Ļe bottom level, unobjectionable and necessary, con-
sists of teaching nuts and bolts like how to construct an Edgeworth box,
run a regression, and punctuate a sentence. Ļe top level, “Sprachethik,”
also unobjectionable, calls for constructive dialogue. Scholars should try to
communicate clearly and avoid shouting and other tricks of intimidation.
On the middle level we find pronouncements about mathematics,
econometrics, modeling, empiricism, armchair theorizing, methodologi-
cal individualism, use of aggregates and averages, use of questionnaires,
experimentation, and so on. Methodologists discuss whether the sup-
posed methods of the natural sciences belong in economics, whether
ȁPaul Samuelson was avowedly joking, but probably only half-joking, when he
reported a negative correlation between the fruitfulness of scientific disciplines and “their
propensity to engage in methodological discussion.... [S]oft sciences spend time in talk-
ing about method because Satan finds tasks for idle hands to do. Nature does abhor a
vacuum, and hot air fills up more space than cold” (ȀȈȅȂ, in CaldwellȀȈȇȃ, p.Ȁȇȇ).