ȁȁȇ Partʺ: Economics
Whether the natural and social sciences are fundamentally similar or
fundamentally different is a pointless concern. What does “fundamental”
mean? All sciences seek propositions of generality and depth (BauerȀȈȄȈ),
seek uniformity amidst superficial diversity, and try to explain initially
puzzling phenomena as examples of familiar or potentially familiar gen-
eralizations, so that curiosity rests (evoking Machlup’s “aha!”). Success in
prediction strengthens the scientist’s hunch that he has found the correct
explanation of some phenomenon. All sciences presumably involve what
Karl Popper called “conjectures and refutations.” All presumably presup-
pose similar ideals of scientific integrity and of openness to critical exami-
nation. On the other hand, any two sciences differ in their specific subject
matters and so in what kinds of empirical observation enter into arousing
curiosity, inspiring conjectures, and sifting hypotheses. Human purposive-
ness and free choice play a role in the social sciences that they cannot play
in the natural sciences. Whether this makes the two fields fundamentally
different is a mere semantic question.
Šōŏ੠řőŠŔśŐśŘśœť ōŠ ţśŞŗ
Here are some signs of poorly articulated methodological thinking:
- Routine questions such as: What hypothesis are you testing? How
could it be falsified? What is your model?
what the individual scientist will do or what method he will follow ... there are as
many scientific methods as there are individual scientists. (pp.ȇȁ–ȇȂ)Questioning the assumption of one or a few best methods, Fritz Machlup identifies the
harmful
attitude of snubbing, disparaging, excommunicating, and prohibiting the working
habits of others and of preaching a methodology that implies that they are inferior
in scientific workmanship. [Machlup’s footnote below.]
Good “scientific method” must not proscribe any technique of inquiry deemed useful
by an honest and experienced scholar. Ļe aggressiveness and restrictiveness of the
various methodological beliefs which social scientists have developed—in subcon-
scious attempts to compensate for their feelings of inferiority vis-a-vis the alleged
“true scientist”—are deplorable. Attempts to establish a monopoly for one method,
to use moral suasion and public defamation to exclude others, produce harmful
restraints of research and analysis, seriously retarding their progress.
[Footnote:] ... I have not said anything against the working habits of others and
have not questioned anybody’s scientific workmanship. I have dealt with their claims
of exclusive possession of the one and only scientific method. (MachlupȀȈȄȅ/ȀȈȆȇ,
p.Ȃȃȃin chap.ȀȂ)