Chapter dzǵ: Tacit Preachments are the Worst Kind ȁȃȆobserved (ȀȇȈȆ/n.d., p.ȇȃǿ), searches especially for phenomena that sup-
port it. Unwittingly he presses the theory and the facts to fit each other.
Chamberlin in effect advocated substituting discussion for debate.
Ļe two are different in spirit. Ļe debater seeks the decision of the
judges for his already adopted conclusion; a discussant searches for truth
(F.A. Harper in a “publisher’s note” to the reprint of Chamberlin’s article).
“Ļe conflict and exclusion of alternatives that is necessary to sharp induc-
tive inference has been all too often a conflict between men, each with
his single Ruling Ļeory. But whenever each man begins to have mul-
tiple working hypotheses, it becomes purely a conflict between ideas. It
becomes much easier then for each of us to aim every day at conclusive dis-
proofs—atstronginference—without either reluctance or combativeness.”
Researchers become excited at seeing how the detective story will turn out
(PlattȀȈȅȃ, p.ȂȄǿ).Ȁǿ
Ļe foregoing views require qualification. Not every researcher need
be testing several hypotheses. Division of labor can be fruitful. Some
researchers may legitimately work to give one particular hypothesis its
best possible shot. It may be instructive for themselves and others to see
what persistence and ingenuity can do toward salvaging even a hypoth-
esis that does indeed seem preposterous on its face. Furthermore, some
may flourish in a setting and incentive structure of rivalry not merely
ȀǿPlatt insightfully warns of the researcher who is method-oriented rather than prob-
lem-oriented.
[A]nyone who asks the question about scientific effectiveness will also conclude that
much of the mathematicizing in physics and chemistry today is irrelevant if not
misleading....
Ļe great value of mathematical formulation is that when an experiment agrees with
a calculation to five decimal places, a great many alternative hypotheses are pretty well
excluded.... But when the fit is only to two decimal places, or one, it may be a trap
for the unwary; it may be no better than any rule-of-thumb extrapolation, and some
other kind of qualitative exclusion might be more rigorous for testing the assumptions
and more important to scientific understanding than the quantitative fit....
Measurements and equations are supposed to sharpen thinking, but, in my obser-
vation, they more often tend to make the thinking noncausal and fuzzy. Ļey tend
to become the object of scientific manipulation instead of auxiliary tests of crucial
inferences.
Many—perhaps most—of the great issues of science are qualitative, not quantita-
tive, even in physics and chemistry. Equations and measurements are useful when
and only when they are related to proof; but proof or disproof comes first and is in
fact strongest when it is absolutely convincing without any quantitative measurement.
(ȀȈȅȃ, pp.ȂȄȀ–ȂȄȁ)