ȁȃȇ Partʺ: Economicsamong ideas but among persons. Differences not merely of abilities, train-
ing, and interests but even of temperaments may be put to good use. But
to the extent that some economists do work ingeniously at protecting their
favorite theories, the task falls all the more to others to perform the nec-
essary confrontations.
Not only real-business-cycle theorists but monetarists must face the
objections voiced by Chamberlin and Platt. Still, monetarism is not irref-
utable in the disreputable sense of enjoying built-in protection against any
adverse evidence. Observations are readily conceivable that would indeed
refute it. If these are merely conceivable, not actual, and if they would
run counter to manifest facts about the role of money in the everyday
activities of individuals and business firms, well, a theory is scarcely at
fault for recognizing those facts.
Ļe method of competing multiple hypotheses scarcely requires that
no question ever be settled, not even tentatively, and that multiple hypothe-
ses always remain in active contention on all topics. It would be no scan-
dal if a strong consensus eventually developed on the monetary (or non-
monetary) nature of business cycles. What would be a scientific scandal
would be to grant certain questions perpetual immunity to ever being
reopened, no matter what new evidence and lines of reasoning might be
developed.
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Countermethodology, which I distinguish favorably from methodology,
does not mean that “anything goes.” It in no way exempts any argument
or supposed evidence from critical inspection. Critics should point out
specific defects, however,—slips in logic and errors of fact—rather than
just sneer broadly at the use of some methods but not others.
Despite Donald McCloskey’s lack of enthusiasm for what he calls
“fallacy-mongering” (ȀȈȇȄ, pp.ȃȇ–ȃȈ), it can be useful to identify and
classify specific types of unsatisfactory argument. McCloskey is emphat-
ically in favor of scholarly dialogue, conversation, or rhetoric. Well, dia-
logue consists largely of critical examination of arguments and evidence
and supposed inferences, and being acquainted with and alert to frequent
types of fallacy can help in this examination. McCloskey himself warns
against some particular types, such as confusion between statistical sig-
nificance and substantive significance of coefficients in fitted equations
(ȀȈȇȅ; alsoȀȈȈȁ, p.ȁȅȆ). Identifying and categorizing fallacies is not at all