Ȃǿȃ Partʺʺ: Politics and PhilosophyWhile the free-will /determinism issue thus dangles unsettled, we all
find ourselves seized with ineradicable impressions (or illusions) that we
enjoy some freedom of action and choice and even of will. When we write
as scholars, we simply cannot believe that our every word is precisely pre-
determined and will draw precisely predetermined reactions from our fel-
low scholars.
Sometimes we find two or more strands of theory applicable to cer-
tain phenomena without our being able—yet, anyway—to reconcile those
strands, which may even appear inconsistent. An example concerns the
apparent dual nature (wave and particle natures) of light and of electrons.
Ļe principle of complementarity, introduced to physics by Niels Bohr,
condones applying each strand of theory where it does good service while
still hoping to reconcile the different strands, perhaps by modifying one
or all (TellerȀȈȇǿ, pp.ȈȂ,ȀǿȄ–Ȁǿȅ,ȀȂȇ–Ȁȃǿ). Economists formerly did
not know, and some would say still do not know, how fully to reconcile
three strands of balance-of-payments analysis, the elasticities, absorption,
and monetary approaches. It makes sense anyway to apply each approach
where it does good service while still seeking a fuller reconciliation among
them.
Similarly, in analyzing the worlds of nature and human affairs, we
find it reasonable to believe in tight causality or in causality loosened by
an element of sheer chance. We also find reason—or at least the pressure
of compelling personal experience—to believe in a loosening by some ele-
ment of free will. Ļe corresponding strands of theory are complementary.
Since we cannot really believe that ethics is a field deprived of subject mat-
ter, let us continue investigating it.Ȇ
Let us condemn, though, the tactic of offering mere cheerleading for
free will in the guise of argument. (Free will is good, those who doubt it
are scoundrels, and we are on the side of the good.) As David Hume said,
“this question should be decided by fair arguments before philosophers,
[rather] than by declamations before the people” (ȀȆȂȈ–ȀȆȃǿ/ȀȈȅȀ, Bk.ŕŕ,
Pt.ŕŕŕ, last paragraph of Sec.ŕŕ).
ȆEdward N. Lorenz (ȀȈȈȂ, pp.ȀȄȈ–Ȁȅǿ) reminds us that we should believe even in
an uncomfortable truth rather than in an appealing falsehood. Ļat premise recommends
believing in free will. If it is a reality, our choice is correct. If it is not, we still shall not
have made an incorrect choice, since, lacking free will, we shall not have made any choice
at all.