Chapter ǴDz: Civic Religion Reasserted ȂȆȂbest case is—provoking the reader toward a judgment of his own—might
be an effective way to reinforce public-choice-type skepticism about activ-
ist democratic government.
One variant of the hypothesis about an intellectual exercise is that
Wittman saw an opportunity to fill a vacant niche in the academic land-
scape. From that hitherto unoccupied “intellectual foxhole” (as Charles
Peirce said), he might sally forth in battle with holders of other posi-
tions. Evidently the marketplace of ideas had left room for an academi-
cally credentialed rehabilitation of what R.W. Bradford (ȀȈȈȂ, pp.ȀȄȈ–ȀȅȄ)
has called “Ļe New Civic Religion”—pop wisdom about the virtue and
efficacy of voting and about the mandates conferred by elections. I do not
know about Wittman, but as a general proposition, holding a distinctive
intellectual position can draw invitations to attend scholarly conferences
and contribute chapters to collective works. Serving as a foil for other posi-
tions is not necessarily disreputable: as John Stuart Mill said inOn Liberty,
truth may sometimes strengthen its appeal by struggle against error, even
contrived error.
Ļe hypothesis about niche-filling meshes with one about the state
of academic economics (at least as diagnosed by several eminent partici-
pants). Academics feel pressure to publish and be noticed. Latching onto
a fad is one way. Delivering shock value—being an iconoclast, challenging
established beliefs—is another way, which can even add to the “fun” of the
game. Occasionally the two approaches can even blend into a kind of rou-
tine originality: extend a fad so as to challenge yet another widely accepted
belief. I have observed plenty of faddism, iconoclasm, and their combina-
tion in my own field of macroeconomics. Certain strands of Chicago and
UCLAeconomics cultivate the fad of arguing that whatever institution
or practice has long endured thereby demonstrates a certain efficiency,
whether or not its rationale has hitherto been spelled out. Such icon-
oclastic faddism (or chic iconoclasm) purports to rationalize forms of
protection and rent-shifting long condemned by mainstream economists.
Wittman’s work could be another example, whether intentionally or not
I do not know.
Following academic practice in one or several of these ways need not
indicate insincerity or other personal immorality. Besides, Leon Festing-
er’s principle of cognitive dissonance may be at work. If one feels uncom-
fortable as a gamesman saying things one does not really believe, one can
remove or forestall the dissonance by coming quite sincerely to believe
those things.