Chapter ǴǸ: Ļe Moral Element in Mises’sHuman Action ȃȃȄOne great insight of Mises, following David Hume and elaborated by
Henry Hazlitt (ȀȈȅȃ), is that direct appeal to the criterion of happiness
over misery is seldom necessary. A surrogate criterion is more tractable.
Actions, institutions, rules, principles, customs, ideals, dispositions, and
character traits count as good or bad according to whether they support
or undercut social cooperation, which is prerequisite to the happiness of
a society’s members. Economics and the other social and natural sciences
have much to say about what does support or undercut it.
Hazlitt gives powerful reasons for repudiating the variety of utilitari-
anism that calls for whatever action seems most likely, on each particular
occasion, to contribute most to the sum total of happiness. Ļat brand,
called “act-utilitarianism,” has now sunk almost to the status of a mere
strawman. Even so, it remains the favorite target of superficial critics. Haz-
litt advocates “rules-utilitarianism” instead, which might better be named
“indirect utilitarianism.” I won’t spell out his reasons for espousing this
version of utilitarianism here. Suffice it to say that he rejects case-by-case
expediency and calls for adherence, almost without exception, to tradi-
tional precepts of morality, ethical principles that do satisfy the utilitarian
criterion. Utilitarian philosophers can give reasons, grounded in reality,
for respecting cherished values.
őŠŔŕŏş ŕŚʲʼʿˀʽ ˀʾʵʺˁʽ
Henry Hazlitt, and Mises before him, forthrightly and courageously
avowed utilitarian ethics in a hostile intellectual atmosphere. Let us look
more closely at what Mises wrote. He identifies ethical doctrines as nor-
mative disciplines concerned with what ought to be. Praxeology and eco-
nomics, in contrast, recognize that ultimate ends are purely subjective.
Ļey judge means by whether or not they are suitable to attain the desired
ends (MisesȀȈȃȈ/ȀȈȅȅ).
Does Mises say that a widely accepted ethical code is essential to a
decently functioning economy? I do not find that he says so explicitly—
perhaps because the point is almost too obvious to need saying. He says so
implicitly, however, when he emphasizes that social cooperation, includ-
ing market relations, is essential to prosperity and happiness and when he
expounds the ethics of social cooperation.
ChapterŢŕŕŕofHuman Actionexplains that the moral rules necessary
for social cooperation constitute an autonomous, rationalistic, and volun-
taristic ethic. Ļey stand in contrast with the heteronomous doctrines both