Is the Market a Test of Truth and Beauty?

(Jacob Rumans) #1
ȃȅȅ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophy

free of actual poverty, it is not clear—at least, not without further argu-
ment—why the cost should be concentrated on a rich minority. Secondly,
suppose that the beneficiaries of the schools and hospitals are not espe-
cially poor and could afford to pay for their services in one of the ways
mentioned. Why, then, should a rich minority have to pay a share of
the costs out of proportion to their share of the benefits? So far as the
beneficiaries of the schools and hospitals escape the cost, they have money
left over to spend on other things. Redistributive taxation may thus in
effect make the rich help pay for the clothing, automobiles, entertain-
ment, and liquor of people who are not poor. Perhaps this is defensi-
ble; but what, then, becomes of the special emotional aura of schools and
hospitals?
Perhaps egalitarianism is an extension of the liberal case for relief
of actual poverty. For, redistributionists might argue, the dividing line
between poverty and adequate income is vague. Even persons in the modal
or typical income brackets may sufferrelativepoverty; they may be uncom-
fortable about not being able to live on the same material plane as the
wealthy minority. If relieving the discomfort of actual poverty is urgent,
then relieving the mental discomfort of relative poverty may be somewhat
advantageous.ȄIn reply, it may be pointed out that while a line between
poverty and material comfort cannot be drawn precisely, a general basis
for the distinction exists. In the United States, the persons to be consid-
ered actually poor are a fairly small minority in material circumstances
well below what is typical. Redistribution to benefit this poor minority
is different in principle from leveling down a rich minority in the sup-
posed interest of a modal majority. Principle, not definite tax schedules, is
what is at issue here. A further aspect of the issue is whether public policy
should recognize the notion ofrelativepoverty and should dignify what-
ever uneasiness some people may feel about the better fortune of others by
basing tax legislation upon it. It is not enough to consider what attitudes
may in fact prevail, causing mental pain or pleasure; social philosophers
also have the job of considering what sorts of attitudes should or should
not be encouraged because they do or do not tend to promote a good soci-
ety, coherently conceived.
ȄAdmittedly I cannot cite a clear statement of this position. Ļe grounds for egalitar-
ianism or redistributionism are so generally regarded as self-evident that a critic must try
to figure out for himself just how the redistributionist case might look if spelled out in
detail in the strongest version he can conceive. Ļis is what I am trying to do, rather than
concocting and refuting flimsy arguments as a debating tactic.

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