ŏ Ŕ ō Ŝ Š ő Ş șȟRights, Contract, and Utility in
Policy Espousal*
ŞŕŢōŘ ŏŞŕŠőŞŕō
Ļis paper defends one version of utilitarianism against supposed alterna-
tives to it as a policy criterion. First it reviews the natural rights doctrine,
contractarianism, and criticisms of each. Several sections state and defend
a broad version of utilitarianism. Examples follow of writings about rights
and contract that tacitly accept utilitarianism. A summary concludes the
paper.
ŚōŠšŞōŘ ŞŕœŔŠş
Clear-cut examples of the antiutilitarian rights doctrine are rare. One rea-
son, apparently, is that doctrines ostensibly of that kind are in fact tacitly
utilitarian—a point developed later. Murray Rothbard (ȀȈȆȂ, pp.ȁȂ–ȁȄ)
observes that most libertarians have adopted natural rights and rejected
both emotivism and utilitarianism as the foundation for their nonaggres-
sion principle. Ļeir basic axiom is the “right to self-ownership,” abso-
lute property in one’s own body. Accordingly, everyone has the right to
perform actions necessary for surviving and flourishing without coercive
molestation. Rothbard then develops a theory of property in nonhuman
objects by appealing to John Locke’s concept of a person’s rightful own-
ership of previously unused natural resources that he first transforms by
his labor (ȀȈȆȂ, pp.ȁȅff.). “Ļese two axioms, the right of self-ownership
and right to ‘homestead,’ establish the complete set of principles of the
libertarian system” (p.ȃǿ).
*FromCato JournalȄ(Spring/SummerȀȈȇȄ):ȁȄȈ–ȁȈȃ. Some sections overlap other
chapters of this book and have been deleted or shortened here.
ȃȆȆ