Chapter ǴǺ: Rights, Contract, and Utility in Policy Espousal ȃȈȄof one’s accuracy in weighing opposing considerations? Ļe assumptions
required negate the real-world context that in fact recommends rules-util-
itarianism over act-utilitarianism.
Suppose for the sake of argument, nevertheless, and quite implausibly,
that a clear case of the postulated kind did arise. Suppose, further, that
arranging compensation acceptable to the prospective victim or victims
was for some reason impossible and that the burden of decision fell on
me. Ļen I would have to face up to that case. I cannot commit myself in
advance, ignorant of the specific facts, to insisting on observance of rules
and rights even though the heavens should crumble. And neither could a
self-styled antiutilitarian champion of rights.
ō ŐőŒőŚşŕŎŘő šŠŕŘŕŠōŞŕōŚŕşř
A sounder version of utilitarianism than the one routinely pilloried has
been called rules-utilitarianism or indirect utilitarianism. ( John Gray,ȀȈȇȂ,
esp. pp.ȀȀ–ȀȄ,ȂȀ–Ȃȁ,Ȃȇ–ȂȈ,ȃȅ–ȃȆ, attributes an indirect utilitarianism to
John Stuart Mill and tries to distinguish it from rules-utilitarianism; for
present purposes the distinction is inessential.)
According to McCloskey, however, rules-utilitarianism arises from
awareness that the act version will not do; yet it is only pseudo-utilitari-
anism. It opts for “irrational” conformity to rules even though no intrinsic
moral significance attaches to them and even when conforming to them
brings greater total evil. Ļe rules-utilitarian prefers conformity to a rule to
maximization of good. If he replies that “his is the best way of promoting
the greatest good, he is abandoning rule for act utilitarianism” (McCloskey
ȀȈȅȈ, p.Ȁȇȇ).
Why, though, does McCloskey speak ofirrationalconformity to rules?
Rules serve human welfare. Utilitarianism of course recognizes dilemma
cases—they figure in the human predicament—in which applicable rules
clash and in which some must be overridden to permit conforming to oth-
ers more demanding in the particular case. To recognize such cases is not
to lapse back into act-utilitarianism or situation ethics. Ļe rules version
does stress the advantages of habituation to rules and does caution against
excessive readiness to override a rule (especially against the temptation to
make an exception in one’s own favor). If the idea of framing the inno-
cent man to pacify the mob so shocks us, it is because we rightly find it so
hard to imagine cases in which the rule of justice should be the one to be
overridden. Ļe quality of McCloskey’s debating tactics is evident in his