ȃȈȅ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophyexample (p.ȀȈȀ) of choosing between abiding by Australia’s drive-on-the-
left rule and colliding with a car in the wrong lane.
As for rules having no “intrinsic” moral significance, well, what is so
suspect about there not being irreducible ultimates for which no argu-
ments can be offered? Of course utilitarianism does not and cannot insist
that rules be followed for their own sakes. On the contrary, rules areinstru-
mentalto a good society and thereby to people’s happiness. To treat rules
as absolute ultimates would undermine respect for them by making them
appear ridiculous.
Let us consider the question of justice and injustice a bit further. Vic-
timizing an innocent person or minority for the supposed greater gain of
others is indeed unjust. But we need not stop short with reporting our
intuition to that effect; we can give reasons for our judgment. We do not
downgrade justice by not regarding it as an undiscussable ultimate. Injus-
tice subverts social cooperation and the pursuit of happiness. Sir James
MacIntosh argued(Vindiciae Gallicae, quoted in HalévyȀȈȄȄ, p.ȀȇȄ) that
the extreme usefulness of general principles of justice makes them morally
obligatory.Justice is expediency, but it is expediency, speaking by general maxims,
into which reason has concentrated the experience of man kind.... When
I assert that a man has a right to life, liberty, &c. I only mean to annunci-
atea moral maximfounded ongeneral interest, which prohibits any attack
on these possessions.... [A Declaration of Rights is an expedient] to keep
alive the Public vigilance against the usurpation of partial interests, by
perpetually presenting the general right and the general interest to the
Public eye.John Stuart Mill (MillȀȈȅȇ, p.ȁȈȈ) said: “Justice is a name for certain
classes of moral rules which concern the essentials of human well-being
more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other
rules for the guidance of life.”şśŏŕōŘ ŏśśŜőŞōŠŕśŚ ōŚŐ ŏśřŜōŞōŠŕŢő ঺ŠŕŠšŠŕśŚş
As an approach to understanding what sorts of individual conduct and
especially what institutions and policies are desirable, rules- or indirect
utilitarianism amounts to much the same thing as the comparative-insti-
tutions or good-society approach. Ļese all have an affinity with the “truth-
judgment” approach disparaged by James Buchanan.