Ȅǿǿ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophyutilitarian grounds. Most of us believe that we should ordinarily practice
the everyday little courtesies toward one another, accepting trivial incon-
veniences for ourselves to spare others substantial ones. Ordinarily, for
example, we do not complain about reasonable noise incidental to useful
activity (“reasonable” is admittedly a weasel word here); for we ourselves
benefit from a society in which such noise is tolerated. Ļe point is not
that we and others have agreed, or are “deemed” to have agreed, to suffer
noise. Such a fiction is unnecessary. Rather, each of us refrains from com-
plaining about reasonable noise in the expectation of others’ similar for-
bearance and in the interest of the social cooperation from which we all
benefit.
Each of us would be uneasy constantly and belligerently insisting on
our “rights,” refusing consideration of others at the cost of even the slight-
est momentary inconvenience, and insisting that others either refrain from
activities exerting the slightest adverse externality or else pay compensa-
tion. Ļat would be a nerve-wracking way to live. We would be inconsis-
tent in being intolerant and inconsiderate of others while expecting them
to be tolerant and considerate of us. Such behavior would emit messages
to others about our own character.
For most of us, furthermore, it serves our self-esteem to think of our-
selves as consistent, considerate persons who play fair and who support
rather than subvert a decent society. Each of us benefits from courtesy
and ease in relations with our fellows. It does not serve our self-esteem or
interest to undercut that spirit. Ļus, we need not interpret tolerant and
considerate behavior toward others as compliance with a contract.
Much the same considerations argue for respecting the legitimacy
of government and an obligation to obey its laws. Ļe argument also
explains why the legitimacy and obligation are not total. Most of us
feel obliged to obey a reasonably decent government on the grounds
that doing so contributes to our own and our fellows’ welfare—in view
of the Hobbesian alternative. Consideration of our fellows, which ordi-
narily serves our self-esteem, requires our not contributing to the sub-
version of a generally useful institution (which government is, even
though a “necessary evil”). Unfairly arrogating special privilege to one-
self, picking and choosing which laws to obey, and making exceptions
in one’s own favor does something toward undermining the legitimacy
and authority of a government from which we ourselves derive net advan-
tages. (I distinguish, of course, between a government that is decent
on the whole and, on the other hand, a tyrannical one that ought, on