Chapter Ǵ: Why Subjectivism? ȃȄpreponderance of benefits or costs will turn out great enough to be unmis-
takable anyway. In any case, expecting the advocates of each of the pos-
sible decisions to quantify their assertions and lay them out for scrutiny
will impose a healthy discipline on the arguments made. It will weaken
the relative influence of sheer poetry, oratory, demagogy, and political
maneuvering.
My last example of subjectivism exaggerated and abused is what even
some members of the Austrian School have identified as a “nihilism”
about economic theory. Nihilistic writings stress the unknowability of the
future, the dependence of market behavior on divergent and vague and
ever-changing subjective expectations, the “kaleidic” nature of the eco-
nomic world, and the poor basis for any belief that market forces are tend-
ing to work toward rather than away from equilibrium (if, indeed, equi-
librium has any meaning). Some of these assertions are relevant enough
in particular contexts, but ultrasubjectivists bandy them sweepingly about
as if willing to cast discredit not merely on attempts to foretell the future
but even on scientific predictions of the if-this-then-that type. It is hard
to imagine why an economist who thus wallows in unknowability contin-
ues to represent himself as an economist at all. (One hunch: he may think
he has an all-purpose methodological weapon for striking down what-
ever strand of analysis or policy argument he happens not to like. But
then his own analysis and arguments—if he has any—would be equally
vulnerable.)
Ļere is no point trying to conceal from knowledgable Austrian read-
ers what economist I particularly have in mind, so I’ll refer to the writ-
ings of Ludwig Lachmann listed in the references (including his arti-
cles in DolanȀȈȆȅand SpadaroȀȈȆȇ), as well as Lachmann’s admira-
tion of Shackle’s writings on the imponderability of the future. Also see
O’Driscoll’s refreshing criticism (in SpadaroȀȈȆȇ, esp. pp.Ȁȁȇ–ȀȂȃ) of
Lachmann for practically repudiating the concepts of the market’s coordi-
nating processes and of spontaneous order.
Most recently, Lachmann has shown evident delight in the phrase
“dynamic subjectivism.” “[A]t least in the history of Austrian doctrine, sub-
jectivism has become progressively more dynamic” (ȀȈȇȄ, p.ȁ). “To Aus-
trians, of all people, committed to radical subjectivism, the news of the
move from static to dynamic subjectivism should be welcome news” (ȀȈȇȄ,
pp.Ȁ–ȁ). Ļe word “committed” is revealing. Instead of the scientific atti-
tude, Lachmann evidently values commitment—commitment to a doc-
trine or to a methodology. Recalling Fritz Machlup’s essay on “Statics