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pragmatic inferences may be drawn. The occurrence of such
instances has led to the development of a typological theory of
functions of repetition.^28 The distinction between allo-repetition
and self-repetition corresponds to distinctions in the pragmatics
of attending to others and attending to oneself. However, this
correspondence is not total in that, for example, allo-repetition
serves (at least) the purpose of reassuring an initial speaker that
a message has been heard but also increasing confidence for the
speaker who repeats that the message was at least correctly
heard. Self-repetition has a strong relationship with persistence
in a dialogue plan. Inversely, allo-repetition avoidance (in its
strongest form, a refusal to adopt the language of one’s dialogue
partners) manifests a focus on the self, and self-repetition
avoidance can indicate the absence of an independent dialogue
plan. The absence of a significant difference in repetition
between actual and randomized dialogues entails a lack of
engagement according to that measure and retention of the null
hypothesis that mutual understanding was not achieved. This
conclusion is based on studies that quantify repetition in
mutually engaged conversation^29 and communication that leads to
success in collaborative tasks.^30
This discussion began with an argument that the null
hypothesis about linguistic success in ordinary conversation
should be that language did not yield mutual understanding;
however, in certain legal contexts, the normal burden of proof
necessitates even greater caution in assuming that linguistic
communication has been successful. The methods discussed here
can be used to mitigate risks associated with inappropriately
rejecting that null hypothesis. In what follows, a range of
dialogues are used to illustrate a theory of repetition in dialogue.
The ramifications of the research are as relevant to forensic
(^28) Note that this is on a different scale of analysis than that of Deleuze of
the general epistemological effects of repetition, but is rather restricted to
linguistic pragmatics, and as such is a contribution to the framework
associated with Tannen. See generally GILLES DELEUZE, DIFFERENCE &
REPETITION (Paul Patton, trans., Athlone Press 2004) (1968); TANNEN, supra
note 14.
(^29) See generally Vogel & Behan, supra note 25, at 73–88.
(^30) Reitter & Moore, supra note 25.