ATTRIBUTION OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING 389
contexts as to safety in air traffic communications: measures of
conversational synchrony can be used to mitigate doubt about
the extent to which, for example, interrogated individuals have
understood the nature of conversations in which they participate,
including, for example, the extent of understanding about
Miranda rights.^31
The paper is structured as follows. First, a method is
described for analyzing interaction in dialogue with respect to
interlocutor alignment. The algorithmic core of this method has
been employed in the analysis of a range of natural dialogues as
recorded in available textual transcripts.^32 The essence of the
method is the evaluation of the degree to which the various
forms of repetition are visible between actual dialogues and a
number of randomized reorderings of the dialogue turns. Where
precise temporal alignment information is available, overlap and
other temporal features of synchronization may also be
measured. Lydia Behan and I illustrated how the measures are
manifest in natural conversations representative of types: one in
which discussion is casual and mutually supportive among
participants of equal social standing and another in a crisis
situation with a clearly defined leader (an aircraft crash
transcript).^33 The work here extends the methods of statistical
analysis further and in directions that support forensic
deployment of the method in the attribution of interlocutor
engagement and understanding of critical legal discourse, for
purposes such as police interview, courtroom testimony, and
cross-examination. The theory developed here is that where
actual repetitions do not exceed random counterparts at all, there
is reason to think that the dialogue exemplifies lack of
engagement and misunderstanding (or rather, there is no reason
to reject the null hypothesis in such a case). Similar assessments
are considered with respect to individual participants within the
dialogues.
(^31) See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (holding
that an accused person must be made aware of his or her constitutional rights
upon arrest, including the right to remain silent).
(^32) See generally Vogel & Behan, supra note 25, at 73–88.
(^33) Id. at 77–87.