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the court held that Red Hook’s Local Law 2, which allowed the
town to refuse Consolidated Edison Company a permit under its
zoning law, was preempted by Article VIII of the Public Service
Law.^315 The court cited the legislature’s purpose, clearly
expressed in Article VIII, and the detailed regulatory structure.^316
Article VIII plainly indicated that the legislature intended “to
provide for the expeditious resolution of all matters concerning
the location of major steam electric generating facilities.”^317 This
was reaffirmed when the Legislature reenacted Article VIII in
1978, asserting “its purpose was to have the Siting Board
balance all interests, including local interests, on a State-wide
basis.”^318 Although there is language indicating the role of the
regulatory structure in the decision, it is clear that the holding
was based primarily on the very express legislative intent
indicated in Article VIII.
Together, these cases illustrate that when the Court of
Appeals examines whether state law impliedly preempts local
law, especially with respect to zoning, it rarely finds such
preemption without an explicit statement from the state
legislature. Although previous Court of Appeals decisions
include language that an explicit expression of legislative intent
is not required,^319 the reality appears to be otherwise. If the
previously mentioned cases are any indication, it does not appear
that any comprehensive regulatory scheme, absent a declared
intention to preempt local power, will be sufficient for the Court
of Appeals to find implied preemption.^320
(^315) See id. at 489–90.
(^316) Id. at 490–91.
(^317) Id. at 490 (quoting L. 1972, ch. 385, § 1).
(^318) Id. (quoting L. 1978, ch. 708, § 1).
(^319) See, e.g., Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903,
906 (N.Y. 1987).
(^320) See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co., 456 N.E.2d at 490 (holding that
Article XIII contained an express statement about the legislature’s intent to
preempt local zoning rules).