THE NERD DEFENSE 771
the trial process offers a system to exclude jurors with potential
biases, “jurors may not be willing to reveal their biases, or they
simply may not recognize they have any biases.”^229 To
counteract unconscious biases held by jurors,^230 the Court has
held that empaneling jurors from “a cross-section of the
community” is a necessary ingredient of the selection of an
impartial jury.^231 However, when a bias is widely held,^232
selection of a jury in this manner is insufficient by itself to
counteract such a bias.^233 Research shows that stereotypes about
those who wear eyeglasses are so powerful as to cross
cultural,^234 gendered,^235 and racial divides.^236 The biases
jury”); Wiley, supra note 74, at 227.
(^229) THORNTON, supra note 83, at 108 (noting that “it is very difficult, if
not impossible, to empanel a jury of twelve ‘blank slates’ capable of hearing
evidence free of influence of past experiences”); see also SUTHERLAND &
CRESSEY, supra note 85, at 442 (noting that in certain cases, “several
thousand prospective jurors have been examined before twelve were secured”
and “[i]n one Chicago trial 9,425 persons were summoned for jury duty and
4,821 were examined before twelve were finally selected”).
(^230) See Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and
Venue Transfers, 53 MD. L. REV. 107, 122 (1994) (noting that the fair-cross-
section doctrine is designed to address juror biases resulting from “deep-
seated hunches and judgments about social life”).
(^231) See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (holding that “[w]e accept the fair-cross-
section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment and are convinced that the requirement has solid foundation”).
For a discussion of the jury-selection process in the context of gender
discrimination, see Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192 (1946). For a
discussion of the jury-selection process in the context of racial discrimination,
see Smith v. State of Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
(^232) Wiley, supra note 74, at 230 (arguing that discrimination based on
physical appearance may be even more “menacing” in American culture than
racial or gender discrimination because everyone discriminates based on
appearance).
(^233) See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 755 (1978) (“The only
practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the
representation of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the respective
biases of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to
cancel each other out.”).
(^234) See Manz & Lueck, supra note 21, at 704.
(^235) See Harris, supra note 56, at 1674–75.
(^236) See Brown, supra note 9, at 3.