The Economist January 22nd 2022 37
China
Artandparty
How propaganda became watchable
I
n 2021, theyear after China overtook
America to become the world’s largest
film market, “The Battle at Lake Changjin”
became the highestgrossing film in Chi
nese history, and the secondhighest of the
year worldwide. It made over $900m, just
behind “SpiderMan: No Way Home”.
The eponymous battle took place in
1950 during the Korean war and saw Mao
Zedong’s army inflict a heavy defeat on
America. The film, which was directed by
Chen Kaige, a leading light of the “fifth
generation” of filmmakers who sprang to
global prominence in the 1980s, has been
especially popular among young Chinese.
Socialmedia users have posted gushing
reviews. Fans posted videos of themselves
eating frozen potatoes and fried flour, like
the soldiers in the film, in tribute to the
hardships of that generation.
But the film is important for another
reason. It was made in close cooperation
with the Communist Party’s propaganda
organs. All films in China must pass party
censors, but until recently, it has been mar
ketdriven comedies and dramas that have
been most popular. Films specifically
aimed at drumming up support for the par
ty have been notable for their dullness. In
2009 “The Founding of a Republic” was the
first of a trilogy released for the 60th anni
versary of the founding of Communist Chi
na. It was such a flop that Douban, a film
rating website, disabled voting. Now, after
a decade of collaborating with serious
filmmakers, the party has worked out how
to make propaganda more like entertain
ment that people actually want to watch.
The government still corrals audiences
and limits choice. In 2021, to celebrate the
100th anniversary of the party, it ordered
every cinema in the country to schedule at
least two screenings each week of films
that are “patriotic” (and which, as usual,
conflate patriotism with support for the
party). Full houses were ensured by bring
ing in officials and party members and by
discounting ticket prices, according to a
policy directive. For “The Battle at Lake
Changjin”, schools booked out cinemas for
their pupils. A Chinese journalist famous
for his investigations into official corrup
tion was detained after he criticised it.
But such measures are now needed less.
Patriotic films and television shows,
known in Chinese as zhu xuanlu—“main
melody” films—often score hundreds of
thousands of high ratings on Douban. A
nationalistic flick from 2017, “Wolf Warrior
2”, ranked higher than twothirds of other
action films. Almost half of all viewers of
the 45 new “mainmelody” television
shows in the first ten months of 2021 were
aged 1824, says Endata, a research firm.
The party wants to build on these suc
cesses. In November the China Film Ad
ministration, which determines whether,
when and how a film is released, published
a new fiveyear plan for 202125. China will
become a “strong film power” by routinely
releasing “masterpieces that manifest Chi
nese spirit, values, power and aesthetics”,
it said. This will require the country to re
lease “ten major films” each year that are
“critically acclaimed and popular” and 50
that make 100m yuan ($16m) or more. Do
mestic films should account for over 55%
of total annual boxoffice receipts.
This should be easy. Local titles ac
counted for 89% of releases in 2021, ac
cording to Dengta, an onlineticketing
platform. The country, which had just
2,600 screens in 2005, now has 82,000
(twice as many as America, where the
number has not grown for a decade). So pa
triotic films are likely to grow in number.
Historical films generated around 15%
of ticket sales in 2020 and 2021, up from
12% in the preceding several years, accord
ing to Dengta. Mainmelody films domin
ated discussions in forums at both the Bei
Patriotic blockbusters are so entertaining people willingly buy tickets
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