46 Europe TheEconomistJanuary22nd 2022
weaponswithouttroops ontheground,
emulatingnato’s airwaragainstSerbiain
1999.Strikesbyrocketlaunchersandmis
sileswouldwreakhavoc.Thesecouldbe
supplemented by more novel weapons,
suchascyberattacksonUkrainianinfra
structureliketheoneswhichdisruptedthe
country’spowergridin 2015 and2016.
Theproblemisthatsuchpunitivecam
paignstendtolastlongerandproveharder
thantheyfirstappear.Ifwarcomes,stand
offstrikesaremorelikelytobea prelude
andaccompanimenttoa groundwarrath
erthana substituteforit.“Idon’tseea lot
betweenthem andKyiv thatcould stop
them,”saysDavidShlapakoftherandCor
poration,a thinktank.
TheaimwouldprobablybetohurtUk
raine,notoccupyit.Thecountryisaslarge
andpopulousasAfghanistan, andsince
2014 over300,000Ukrainianshavegained
someformofmilitaryexperience;most
haveaccesstofirearms.Americanofficials
havetoldalliesthatthePentagonandcia
wouldbothsupportanarmedinsurgency.
RussiamightconsiderwhatAmerica’s
armycallsa “thunderrun”,saysMrShla
pak,a swiftanddeepassaultona narrow
front,intendedtoshockandparalysethe
enemyratherthanseizeterritory.Andan
attackneednotcomesolelyfromtheeast.
OnJanuary17thRussiantroops,some
fromthefareast,beganarrivinginBelarus,
ostensiblyformilitaryexercisesscheduled
forFebruary.Russiahassaiditwillalso
senda dozenwarplanesandtwos400air
defencesystems.Anattackfromthenorth,
overtheBelarusUkraineborder,wouldal
lowRussiatoapproachtheUkrainiancap
italfromthewestandencircleit.
“Once they’rewithin rocket rangeof
downtownKyiv,”asksMrShlapak,“isthata
situation the Ukrainians want to live
with?” Even if Volodymyr Zelensky,
Ukraine’spresident,iswillingtotoleratea
siege,Russiamaygamblethathisgovern
mentwillsimplycollapse—anditmayuse
spies,specialforcesanddisinformationto
hastenthatprocess.
Wars,though,unfoldinunpredictable
ways.Russiahasnotfoughta largescale
offensiveinvolvinginfantry,armourand
airpowersincetheclimacticbattlesofthe
secondworldwar.Countriesunderattack
canjustaseasilystandfirmasfallapart.
IvanTimofeevoftheRussianInternational
AffairsCouncilwarnsofa “longandslug
gishconfrontation”thatwouldbe“fraught
withdestabilisationof...Russiaitself”.
Evenvictorywouldbecostly.“TheUk
rainianswillfightandinflictmajorlosses
ontheRussians,”saysPeterZwack,a re
tiredgeneralwhowasAmerica’sdefence
attachéinMoscowduringtheKremlin’s
firstinvasionofUkrainein2014.“Thisis
goingtobehardforRussia—andtheyare
basicallyalone.”Coupledwiththethreatof
heavysanctionsbeingpreparedbyAmeri
caanditsEuropeanallies,andtheappar
entabsenceofanydomesticsupportfora
newadventure,allthismay,evennow,be
givingMrPutinpauseforthought.n
Moscow
Tallinn
Kyiv
Seaof
Azov
BlackSea
BalticSea
UKRAINE
BELARUS
SWEDEN
Gotland
Kaliningrad
POLAND
HUNG.
ROMANIA
TURKEY
LITH.
LAT.
EST.
RUSSIA
Crimea
Controlledby
Russian-backed
separatists
Abkhazia GEORGIA
South
Ossetia
500 km
Source:CSIS
PotentialRussian
advances
NATO members
FranceandEurope
An ever-closer
union
F
iveyearsago,whenBrexitprompted
fears that the European Union would
unravel, Emmanuel Macron put Europe at
the heart of his political identity. Suppor
ters at his rallies enthusiastically waved
the eu flag. So it was no surprise that, with
France in charge of the rotating sixmonth
presidency of the Council of the eu since
January 1st, the French president headed
on January 19th to the European Parlia
ment in Strasbourg to renew his vows.
The eu, declared Mr Macron, represent
ed democracy, progress and peace at a time
when each was under threat. Faced with
rising authoritarian powers, breaches of
the rule of law within the euand the men
ace of war on its doorstep, “European civi
lisation” needed to be upheld and cher
ished. He pleaded for a “new security or
der” in Europe. Resolute Atlanticists, espe
cially in eastern Europe, hate the idea,
which they think undermines nato, but it
is an abiding French passion. France had
hung the eu flag alone under the Arc de
Triomphe to launch the French presidency,
noted the president—a decision met with
howls of protest by his domestic oppo
nents. “I’m proud of that,” he declared.
The French opposition meps in the
chamber, however (including a presiden
tial candidate, the Greens’ Yannick Jadot),
did their best to turn the event into a cam
paign debate. And miffed as Mr Macron
was made out to be, the exercise struck a
distinctly domestic note. For the presi
dent, expected shortly to confirm that he is
running for reelection, is hoping once
again to use Europe as a political football.
In some respects, only a brave politi
cian seeks to put Europe at the forefront of
a French electoral campaign. The country
may be coarchitect of the postwar pro
ject, but in 2005 the French voted in a refer
endum against a draft eu constitution. In
2017 48% of the firstround vote at the pres
idential election went to candidates, such
as the nationalist Marine Le Pen, who are
Europhobic or Eurosceptic. Last year a poll
found that only 53% of the French were op
timistic about the eu, compared with 67%
of Germans.
France is split over Europe. Hostility to
the eu characterises the political extremes.
This includes the radical left, whose candi
date, JeanLuc Mélenchon, is better placed
than any other on the left. And it marks the
hard right, including Ms Le Pen and Eric
Zemmour, a polemicist running on a vis
cerally antiimmigration platform to “res
cue France”.
In contrast, there is a broad proEuro
pean consensus among the mainstream
candidates. It reaches from Mr Jadot and
the Socialists’ Anne Hidalgo via Mr Macron
to the Republicans’ Valérie Pécresse. This
broadly reflects what the French call
Gaullo-Mitterrandisme: a general continu
ity in foreign policy between Charles de
Gaulle, on the right, and François Mitter
rand, on the left, over the need for France
to retain an independent voice, while re
maining a Western ally, notes François
Heisbourg of the Foundation for Strategic
Research. To this end Europe is a way for
France to enhance its voice, not dilute it.
Yet this underlying division over Eu
rope is less clear now than in 2017. Mr Mé
lenchon no longer promises to tear up all
eu treaties, although he still wants France
out of nato. Ms Le Pen maintains that her
vision of Europe is the “antithesis” of Mr
Macron’s, and wants to pull France out of
nato’s integrated military command. But
she has now dropped all talk of Frexit, and
no longer vows to take France out of the eu
ro, a policy that proved unpopular. Instead,
by promising to protect the French consti
tution from eulaw, her strategy is to try to
undermine the union from within, like her
friends in Poland and Hungary.
Mr Macron’s most credible challenger,
Mrs Pécresse, holds proEuropean views
that are not so very different from his. She
has had to nod to the nationalist wing of
her party. She denounced the solo flying of
the eu flag, and backs the idea of building
barbedwire walls to funnel migrants on
the eu’s external border to reception
points. But her underlying sympathies are
with the eu as a political project. In short,
nobody is quite as enthusiasticabout Eu
rope as Mr Macron. But norarethe differ
ences quite as stark as before.n
P ARIS
Emmanuel Macron’s rivals are less
Eurosceptic than before