The Economist January 22nd 2022 Europe 49Thenoisyunion
W
hen eastern europeancountries about to join the euin
2003 spoke up in favour of America’s invasion of Iraq, Fran
ce’s president at the time, Jacques Chirac, haughtily declared they
had “missed a good opportunity to shut up”. Their furious re
sponse suggested they thought the same of him. Europe likes to
stress its collective power, born of an evercloser union that in
cludes joint foreignpolicy ambitions and dreams of an euarmy.
Yet each country also wants a licence to pursue pet diplomatic for
ays. While sometimes these policiesare sound (like opposing ill
fated invasions in the Middle East, it turned out), occasionally
they end up dragging the entire bloc into fights it would rather
avoid. If Europe wants geopolitical relevance, it cannot allow ev
ery member to foment its own crises.
The eu’s foreignpolicy grandees are currently upset and divid
ed about Ukraine. Russia and America, in their standoff over the
country, seem to think of Europe more as a convenient place to
meet than as a partner to be included, prompting France’s Presi
dent Emmanuel Macron to this week renew his calls for greater
European autonomy. Germany is at odds with its partners over
how to respond to Russia. Fortunately for underemployed wonks
another, lessnoticed, superpower spat is brewing. China is trying
to throttle the Lithuanian economy. The clash pits the world’s
most populous country against the eu’s 21stbiggest member.
Lithuania is being punished mainly for having allowed Taiwan
(which China considers part of its own territory) to use the word
“Taiwan” to describe its unofficial embassy, rather than “Taipei
Representative Office”, as it does elsewhere at China’s insistence.
Retribution has been swift. In a novel form of bureaucratic as
sault, Lithuania suddenly disappeared as an option on Chinese
customs forms, thus blocking all imports from the Baltic minnow.
This was inconvenient, to be sure, but generated little more than
muted sympathy in European capitals. What support there was
came more out of habit than conviction. Privately diplomats ech
oed Chirac: Lithuania had piped up out of turn. What on earth did
it think it was up to, anyway? Other eucountries had lived for de
cades with the Taipei fudge.
Perhaps luckily for Lithuania, China’s ire soon morphed into
grotesque overreaction. Insults flew in state media. In November
Lithuania’sembassyinBeijing was summarily downgraded to a
lowlier diplomatic status. Staff, fearing for their safety, had to be
evacuated. That left diplomats from other eucountries (and prob
ably beyond) wondering whether they might be next. Then com
panies from across Europe whose exports to China merely con
tained Lithuanian components were also targeted for bureaucrat
ic harassment. This was felt—or at least could be construed—as
amounting to an attack on the bloc’s vaunted single market. That
it inconvenienced German carpart makers probably helped get
the attention of politicians there, and thus beyond.
China’s short fuse has helped fire up Lithuania’s claim that the
spat is a test case for the rulesbased international order, and thus
one that the rest of the euhas to get behind. This is happening, al
beit with stillgrudging enthusiasm. The European Commission,
which deals with the eu’s external trade, is diligently putting to
gether a case that China is breaching its obligations as a member
of the World Trade Organisation. This might (one day) generate the
faintest of blushes in Beijing. The boss of the eu’s foreignpolicy
apparatus, Josep Borrell, on January 14th promised solidarity and
to iron things out at a proposed EuropeChina summit in March.
The big member states, whose diplomatic heft underpins the
eu’s, have now waded in. France is promoting an “anticoercion”
plan that it hopes would deter bullies such as China, which it
wants to push in its sixmonth stint chairing meetings of eumin
isters. (The plan is nowhere near ready, nor agreed.) A German
minister visited Lithuania to express support, but Olaf Scholz,
Germany’s new chancellor, did not raise the issue in a getto
knowyou call with China’s president, Xi Jinping, in December. Nobody can hear euscream
Much of foreign policy involves responding to crises. But Europe
makes the job all the harder for itself if those crises are conjured
up from within. Blaming Lithuania for the headache now borne in
part by its allies is hardly fair: it is China’s ghoulish reaction that is
the problem here. Standing up for Taiwan is laudable; arguably a
more forceful defence of the place would be sensible eupolicy. Yet
the manner in which it has had to be done—or not quite done—
hardly inspires confidence. In so far as European allies have had to
step in, decisions made by one member state have in effect been
made on behalf of the whole, yet without their say. Grand strategic
planning this is not.
Europe has ambitions to use its limited means to nudge China
into changing its ways. An investment agreement both sides were
keen on was shelved last year after a flurry of sanctions and coun
tersanctions over human rights in Xinjiang. The push and pull of
careful diplomacy is constantly at work. But China, like others be
fore it, has found it easy to divide Europe at its convenience. Many
eastern European countries a decade ago cosied up to it in a format
designed to circumvent the eu’s own structures, known as “16+1”
(which Lithuania left last year and which seems to be fading). That
now looks a lot like some countries treating the eu as just another
club that helps them further their interest—while expecting sol
idarity when things go wrong.
Lithuania will survive its scrape with Chinese fury. The con
tainers turned away from Chinese ports have been snapped up by
Taiwan, which now has enough Lithuanian rum to last a lifetime.
The Baltic country has been promised sizeable investment from
Taiwanese microchip firms. So it has pipedupandavoided catas
trophe. Good news, it might feel. But it is alsoanother reminder of
just how hard foreign policy is for a club of 27.nCharlemagne
A cacophony of national policies stands in the way of Europe’s geopolitical aspirations