incursion by an aggressive enemy but also a spe-
cies of civil war. The rebellion of the D.P.R. and
L.P.R. has lasted this long because it has exposed
deep cracks in Ukrainian society. And while the
war is regional and intimate, its front is also the
front in a revived global struggle, between an
ever more assertive Russia and the West.
The crisis in Donbas originates in the 2010
election to the presidency of Ukraine of Vik-
tor Yanukovych, the longtime political boss of
Donbas. For years before his election, Ukraine
had grown steadily closer to the West, a trend
that pleased progressive and nationalistic Ukrai-
nians but displeased conservative Russophiles
like Yanukovych. He reversed course, restoring
the country’s relationship with Russia. When
he scuttled an economic agreement with the
European Union in fall 2013, progressive Ukrai-
nians reacted with demonstrations, fi rst in Kyiv
and then around the country. Matters turned
violent, and by the end of the Euromaidan, as
the demonstrations came to be known, about a
hundred civilians and more than a dozen police
offi cers were dead.
Ukrainians who supported Euromaidan called
it the Revolution of Dignity. To them, Yanukovych
and the security forces were to blame. But to
many other Ukrainians, particularly in places like
Donbas, where attachment to Russia runs deep,
the reality seemed the reverse. What they saw
was vicious young people being egged on, if not
outright organized — as Russian news assured
them — by the West.
Yanukovych fl ed to Russia on Feb. 22, 2014.
Five days later, Russia invaded the Crimean Pen-
insula. Overwhelmed, the Ukrainian government
did not fi ght. Within three weeks, Crimea was
annexed. Ukraine’s Western allies declined to
intervene, instead imposing sanctions on Rus-
sia. The invasion put an end to whatever rap-
prochement the West and Russia had eff ected
to that point.
Soon after in Donbas, counterprotests against
Euromaidan transformed into an armed uprising
against the Ukrainian national government. It
was led by a mixture of Ukrainians and Russian
nationals, including current and former mem-
bers of the Russian security services and military,
some of whom had taken part in the invasion ofCrimea. Within weeks, the D.P.R. and L.P.R. had
proclaimed their existence. Hasty referendums
to declare them independent of Ukraine were
held and passed with 89 percent of the vote in
the D.P.R. and 96 percent in the L.P.R., at least
according to the secessionist leaders.
Attempts at political secession spread as far
as Odessa to the south and Kharkiv to the west.
Residents of Kyiv started air-raid drills. Fearing
the whole country might soon be occupied, peo-
ple like Yaroslav Semenyaka went to the front.
With an ad hoc force of regulars and volunteers,
Ukraine counterattacked, pushing the secession-
ists back toward the border. The Russian military
responded with artillery and airstrikes. Tanks
without number plates carried soldiers without
insignia — the ‘‘little green men,’’ as they came
to be known. Intense combat persisted until late
2015, when the front line solidifi ed. The war has
been essentially deadlocked since.
Putin is open about annexing Crimea. Beyond
conceding that Russian intelligence offi cers were
in eastern Ukraine at the beginning of the war,
however, he refuses to admit a formal Russian
role in Donbas. He’ll say only that Russian vol-
unteers have crossed the border to help with
an indigenous uprising and protect ‘‘Russian30 1.23.22 Photograph by Paolo Pellegrin/Magnum, for The New York TimesLarisa, whose husband,
Igor, was critically
injured when their
apartment was shelled.