454 a note on the three orientationssacrifi cial empathy; and, above all, with the eff ort either to deny the in-
eradicable defects in the human condition or to provide reprieve from
their sorrows. Th e substitution of one ethic (of inclusive fellow- feeling)
for another (of masterful self- assertion) represented the advanced front
of a larger change: the ascent of human life to a higher plane, our en-
hanced sharing in the life of God or in the nature of that which is most
real and sacred. Such participation could be achieved only by a break
with the established way of living and of or ga niz ing society. It was, for
example, incompatible with the parallel ordering of castes or classes in
society, as well as of faculties in the self or the soul, that Dumézil found
to be widespread among the Indo- European peoples. It required a pro-
found transformation in practice as well as in belief.
In the argument about the three orientations, however, the diff er-
ences among them are at least as important as their common ground.
Because my discussion emphasizes distinctions among the orientations
even more than their commonalities and accords priority to the logic of
these spiritual options, rather than to the historical development of any
par tic u lar instance of them, it should give no off ense to the historian of
religion.
Th e commonalities gain signifi cance in light of the diff erences. Th e
historical examples are secondary to the philosophical and theological
argument, the aims of which are wholly foreign to the Axial Age cam-
paign. My argument about these past religious revolutions, about what
they had in common as well as about the contrasting directions that
they set, is motivated, directly and transparently, by a single purpose:
the defense of another direction for the future. To take this direction,
we must break with that common ground, undertaking religious revo-
lution with new content and in new form. Nothing could be further
from the intentions of the proponents of the Axial Age thesis.
- Th e historical contexts and agents of past religious revolution. Th e
diff erence in motivation and substance between my view of the reli-
gious revolutions of the past and the conception of the Axial Age is
manifest as well in assumptions and claims about historical contexts
and agents.
Two aspects of this diff erence suffi ce to suggest the broader meaning
of what may appear at fi rst to be no more than a historical quibble, con-