Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in Religious Studies – Anthology
8But, finally, even if we c onc ede that this is an ont ologic al princ iple, it will
provide a solut ion for t he problem of evil only if one is prepared t o say, ‘Evil exist s,
but only just enough evil to serve as the c ounterpart of good’. I doubt whether any
t heist will ac c ept t his. Aft er all, t he ontological requirement that non-redness should
occur would be satisfied even if all the universe, except for a minute speck, were
red, and, if there were a corresponding requirement for evil as a counterpart to
good, a minute dose of evil would presumably do. But t heist s are not usually willing
to say, in all c ontexts, that all the evil that oc c urs is a minute and nec essary dose.
- ‘Evil is necessary as a means to good.’
It is sometime suggested that evil is necessary for good not as a counterpart
but as a means. In it s simple form t his has lit t le plausibilit y as a solut ion of t he
problem of evil, sinc e it obviously implies a severe rest ric t ion of God’s power. It
would be a causal law that you c annot have a c ertain end without a c ertain means,
so that if God has to introduc e evil as a means to good, he must be subject to at
least some causal laws. T his c ert ainly c onflic t s wit h what a t heist normally means
by omnipotenc e. T his view of God as limit ed by c ausal laws also c onflic t s wit h t he
view that causal views are themselves made by God, which is more widely held
than the c orresponding view about the laws of logic. T his c onflic t would, indeed, be
resolved if it were possible for an omnipot ent being t o bind himself, and t his
possibilit y has st ill t o be c onsidered. Unless a favorable answer can be given t o t his
question, the suggestion that evil is necessary as a means to good solves the
problem of evil only by denying one of it s c onst it uent proposit ions, eit her t hat God
is omnipotent or that ‘omnipotent’ means what it says.
- ‘The universe is bett er wit h some evil in it t han it c ould be if t here were no evil.’
Muc h more important is a solution whic h at first seems to be a mere variant of
the previous one, that evil may c ontribute to the goodness of a whole in whic h it is
found, so that the universe as a whole is bet t er as it is, wit h some evil in it , t han it
would be if there were no evil. T his solut ion may be developed in eit her of t wo
ways. It may be supported by an aesthetic analogy, by the fact that contrasts
heighten beauty, that in a music al work, for example, t here may oc c ur disc ords
whic h somehow add to the beauty of the work as a whole. Alt ernat ively, it may be
worked out in c onnec tion with the notion of progress, that the best possible
organizat ion of t he universe will not be st at ic , but progressive, t hat t he gradual
overc oming of evil by good is really a finer t hing t han would be t he et ernal
unc hallenged supremac y of good.
In either c ase, this solution usually starts from the assumption that the evil
whose existence gives rise to the problem of evil is primarily what is c alled physic al
evil, that is to say, pain. In Hume’s rather half-hearted presentation of the problem
of evil, t he evils that he stresses are pain and disease, and those who reply to him
argue that the existenc e of pain and disease makes possible the existence of
sympathy, benevolenc e, heroism, and the gradually suc c essful struggle of doc tors
and reformers to overcome these evils. In fact, theists often seize the opportunity
to accuse those who stress the problem of evil of taking a low, mat erialist ic view of
good and evil, equating these with pleasure and pain, and of ignoring the more
spirit ual goods whic h c an arise in t he st ruggle against evils.