Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in Religious Studies – Anthology
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or nat ural order, c harac t erized as rit a: t his is t he c reat ive purpose t hat
c irc umsc ribes human behaviour. The soc ial and moral order is thus c onc eived ‘as a
c orrelate of the natural order. This is the ordered c ourse of things, the truth of
being or reality (sat) and henc e the Law’ (Rigveda 1.123: 5.8).
One therefore does that whic h is c onsistent with, or whic h promotes, the good
so perceived, and desists from doing that whic h produc es the bad things or effec ts,
so that overall the order is not unduly disturbed. One may also attempt to prevent
or overcome the untoward effects of certain actions. An act is therefore right if it
c onforms to this general princ iple, and an ac t is wrong if it c ontravenes it, and
hence is anrita (disorder) (Rigveda 10.87.11). Since to do what is right safeguards
t he good of all qua rit a (t he fac t ual order), it is assumed t hat it is more or less
obligatory to do or perform the right ac t s (t he ‘ought ’ or moral order). T his
c onvergenc e of the c osmic and the moral orders is universally c ommended in the
all -embrac ing c ategory of dharma, whic h bec omes more or less the Indian
analogue for ethic s.
‘Right ’ or right ness is ident ified wit h ‘rit e’, ie it is formalized as rit ual, wit h
varying c ontent. In other words, the obligation derived from a value, say, survival
of the race, becomes the value itself, eg sacrifice, regardless of what is offered in
the ac t. Rite now c omes to possess an intrinsic moral wort h. But it also assumes a
power all it s own, and people are disposed t o pursuing rit es or rit uals for egoist ic
ends. One group may claim entitlement and therefore advantage over others as to
t he presc ribed rit es, t heir c ont ent , c orrec t performanc e, utility, and so on. This
leads to the working out of differential duties and moral codes for the different
groups in t he larger soc ial c omplex. Different iat ion is superimposed on t he organic
unit y of nat ure and individuals alike.
What c ounts as ethic s, then, although in appearanc e naturalistic , is largely
normat ive: t he just ific at ion usually is t hat t his is t he ‘divined’ ordering of t hings,
and henc e there is a tendenc y also to absolutize the moral law.
That is not, however, to say that genuine issues, c onc erns and paradoxes of
ethical relevance do not get raised, even if these appear to be couched in religious,
myt hic al or myt hologic al t erms. T o give an illust rat ion: sc ript ures presc ribe
avoidanc e of flesh; but a priest would wrong the gods if he refuses to partake of a
c ertain ritual offering involving an animal. With the gods wronged, order c an’t be
maintained: whic h then should he do? (Kane, 1969, 1. 1.) Here we are led into an
ethical discussion. What we have sketched above is, admittedly, a sweeping
ac c ount t hat basic ally c overs t he very early period (c. 1500-800 BCE), during whic h
t ime t he Brahmanic al t radit ion grew and flourished. T his also out lines a broad
framework for looking at how moral consciousness, various ethical concepts and
often competing moral schemes develop and become articulated in later periods,
whic h we may ident ify as t he ‘Hindu’ et hic al t radit ion.