Religious Studies Anthology

Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in Religious Studies – Anthology

14

Extract 2: Antony Flew and R.M. Hare, ‘Theology and Falsification: A
Symposium’ (1971)

Taken from: T he Philosophy of Religion edit ed by Basil Mit c hell (Oxford Universit y
Press, 1977), Chapt er I, T heology and Falsific at ion: A Symposium, pp. 13–18.

A. ANTHONY F LEW

LET us begin with a parable. It is a parable developed from a tale told by John
Wisdom in his haunting and revelatory artic le 'Gods'. Onc e upon a time two
explorers c ame upon a c learing in the jungle. In the c learing were growing many
flowers and many weeds. One explorer says, 'Some gardener must tend this plot.'
The other disagrees, 'There is no gardener.' So they pitc h their tents and set a
watch. No gardener is ever seen. 'But perhaps he is an invisible gardener.' So they
set up a barbed-wire fenc e. T hey elec t rify it. T hey pat rol wit h bloodhounds. (For
they remember how H. G. Wells's 'Invisible Man' c ould be both smelt and touc hed
though he c ould not be seen.) But no shrieks ever suggest that some intruder has
received a shock. No movements of the wire ever betray an invisible climber. The
bloodhounds never give cry. Yet still the Believer is not c onvinc ed. 'But there is a
gardener, invisible, int angible, insensible t o elec t ric shoc ks, a gardener who has no
scent and makes no sound, a gardener who comes secretly to look after the garden
whic h he loves.' At last t he Sc ept ic despairs, 'But what remains of your original
assert ion? Just how does what you c all an invisible, int angible, et ernally elusive
gardener differ from an imaginary gardener or even from no gardener at all?'

In this parable we can see how what starts as an assertion, that something
exists or that there is some analogy between certain complexes of phenomena,
may be reduced step by step to an altogether different status, to an expression
perhaps of a 'picture preference'.The Sceptic says there is no gardener. The
Believer says there is a gardener (but invisible etc .). One man talks about sexual
behaviour. Another man prefers to talk of Aphrodite (but knows that there is not
really a superhuman person addit ional t o, and somehow responsible for, all sexual
phenomena). T he process of qualification may be checked at any point before the
original assert ion is c omplet ely wit hdrawn and somet hing of t hat first assert ion will
remain (t aut ology). Mr. Wells's invisible man c ould not , admit t edly, be seen, but in
all other respects he was a man like the rest of us. But though the proc ess of
qualific at ion may be, and of c ourse usually is, c hec ked in t ime, it is not always
judic iously so halt ed. Someone may dissipat e his assert ion c omplet ely wit hout
notic ing that he has done so. A fine brash hypothesis may thus be killed by inc hes,
the death by a thousand qualific ations.

And in this, it seems to me, lies the peculiar danger, the endemic evil of
theologic al utteranc e. Take suc h utteranc es as 'God has a plan', 'God c reated the
world', 'God loves us as a fat her loves his c hildren.' T hey look at first sight very
much like assertions, vast cosmological assertions. Of course, this is no sure sign
that they either are, or are intended to be, assertions. But let us confine ourselves
to the c ases where those who utter suc h sentenc es intend them to express
assertions. (Merely remarking parenthetic ally that those who intend or interpret
suc h utteranc es as c rypto-commands, expressions of wishes, disguised
ejac ulations, c onc ealed ethic s, or as anything else but assert ions, are unlikely t o
succeed in making them either properly orthodox or practically effective.)