Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in Religious Studies – Anthology
23
THE ARGUMENT FROM CONTINGENCY
Copleston: Well, for c larit y's sake, I'll divide t he argument int o dist inc t st ages.
First of all, I should say, we know that there are at least some beings in the world
whic h do not c ontain in themselves the reason for their existenc e. For example, I
depend on my parents, and now on the air, and on food, and so on. Now, sec ondly,
t he world is simply t he real or imagined t ot alit y or aggregat e of individual objec t s,
none of whic h c ontain in themselves alone the reason of their existenc e. There isn't
any world distinc t from the objec ts whic h form it, any more than the human rac e is
s o me t h in g a p a rt f ro m t h e me mb e rs. Therefore, I should say, since objects or
events exist, and since no object of experience contains within itself the reason of
its existence, this reason, the totality of objects, must have a reason external to
itself. And that reason must be an existent being.
Well, t his being is eit her it self t he reason for it s own exist enc e, or it is not. If it is,
well and good. If not, then we must proc eed further. But if we proc eed to infinity in
that sense, then there's no explanation of existenc e at all. So, I should say, in
order to explain existenc e, we must c ome to a Being whic h c ontains within itself the
reason for its own existenc e, that is to say, whic h c annot not exist.
Russell: This raises a great many points and it's not altogether easy to know
where to begin, but I think that, perhaps, in answering your argument, the best
point with whic h to begin is the question of a Nec essary Being. The word
"nec essary" I should maint ain, c an only be applied signific ant ly t o proposit ions.
And, in fac t, only to suc h as are analyt ic – that is to say – such as it is self-
contradictory to deny. I could only admit a Necessary Being if there were a being
whose existence it is self-c ontradic tory to deny. I should like to know whether you
would ac c ept Leibniz's division of propositions into truths of reason and truths of
fac t. T he former – the truths of reason – being necessary.
Copleston: Well, I c ert ainly should not subsc ribe t o what seems t o be Leibniz's
idea of truths of reason and truths of fac t, sinc e it would appear that, for him, t here
are in the long run only analytic propositions. [It would seem that for Leibniz truths
of fact are ultimately reducible to truths of reason. That is to say, to analytic
proposit ions, at least for an omnisc ient mind. Well, I c ouldn't agree wit h that. For
one thing it would fail to meet the requirements of the experience of freedom. I
don't want to uphold the whole philosophy of Leibniz. I have made use of his
argument from c ontingent to Nec essary Being, basing the argument on the
princ iple of sufficient reason, simply because it seems to me a brief and clear
formulation of what is, in my opinion, the fundamental metaphysic al argument for
God's existence.
Russell: But, to my mind, a "nec essary proposition" has got to be analytic. I don't
see what else it c an mean. And analyt ic proposit ions are always c omplex and
logic ally somewhat lat e. "Irrat ional animals are animals" is an analyt ic proposit ion;
but a proposition suc h as "This is an animal" c an never be analytic. In fac t, all the
propositions that c an be analyt ic are somewhat lat e in t he build-up of propositions.
Copleston: Take the proposition "if there is a c ontingent being then there is a
Nec essary Being." I c onsider t hat t hat proposit ion hypot het ic ally expressed is a
necessary proposition. If you are going to call every necessary proposition an
analyt ic proposit ion, t hen – in order t o avoid a disput e in t erminology – I would