Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in Religious Studies – Anthology
26Copleston: Yes, I should add we don't know the essenc e a priori. It is only t rue a
posteriori through our experienc e of the world that we c ome to a knowledge of the
existence of that Being. And then one argues, the essence and existence must be
identical. Because if God's essence and God's existence were not identical, then
some suffic ient reason for this existenc e would have to be found beyond God.
Russell: So it all turns on this question of suffic ient reason, and I must say you
haven't defined "suffic ient reason" in a way that I c an understand – what do you
mean by suffic ient reason? You don't mean c ause?
Copleston: Not necessarily. Cause is a kind of suffic ient reason. Only c ontingent
being c an have a c ause. God is His own suffic ient reason; but He is not c ause of
Himself. By suffic ient reason in the full sense I mean an explanation adequate for
the existence of some particular being.
Russell: But when is an explanation adequate? Suppose I am about to make a
flame with a match. You may say that the adequate explanation of that is that I rub
it on the box.
Copleston: Well, for prac t ic al purposes – but t heoret ic ally, t hat 's only a part ial
explanation. An adequate explanation must ultimately be a total explanation, to
whic h nothing further c an be added.
Russell: Then I c an only say you're looking for something whic h c an't be got, and
whic h one ought not to expec t to get.
Copleston: To say that one has not found it is one thing; to say that one should
not look for it seems to me rather dogmatic.
Russell: Well, I don't know. I mean, the explanation of one thing is another thing
whic h makes the other thing dependent on yet another, and you have to grasp this
sorry sc heme of things entire to do what you want, and that we c an't do.
Copleston: But are you going to say that we c an't, or we shouldn't even raise the
question of the existenc e of the whole of this sorry sc heme of things – of the whole
universe?
Russell: Yes, I don't think there's any meaning in it at all. I think the word
"universe" is a handy word in some c onnec tions, but I don't think it stands for
anything that has a meaning.
Copleston: If the word is meaningless, it c an't be so very handy. In any c ase, I
don't say that the universe is something different from the objec ts whic h c ompose
it (I indic at ed t hat in my brief summary of t he proof).
What I'm doing is to look for the reason, in this c ase the c ause of the objec ts – the
real or imagined t ot alit y of whic h c onstitute what we c all the universe. You say, I
think that the universe – or my existence if you prefer, or any other existence – is
unint elligible?
Russell: First may I take up the point that if a word is meaningless it can't be
handy. That sounds well but isn't in fac t c orrec t. Take, say, suc h a word as "the" or
"than." You c an't point to any objec t that those words mean, but they are very
useful words; I should say the same of "universe." But leaving that point, you ask