Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in Religious Studies – Anthology
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whether I c onsider that t he universe is unint elligible. I shouldn't say unint elligible –
I t hink it is wit hout explanat ion. Int elligible, t o my mind, is a different t hing.
Int elligible has t o do wit h t he t hing it self int rinsic ally and not wit h it s relat ions.
Copleston: Well, my point is t hat what we c all t he world is int rinsic ally
unintelligible, apart from the existence of God. You see, I don't believe that the
infinity of the series of events – I mean a horizontal series, so to speak – if suc h an
infinit y c ould be proved, would be in the slightest degree relevant to the situation.
If you add up c hoc olates you get c hoc olates after all and not a sheep. If you add up
c hoc olates to infinity, you presumably get an infinite number of c hoc olates. So if
you add up c ontingent beings to infinit y, you st ill get c ont ingent beings, not a
Nec essary Being. An infinit e series of c ont ingent beings will be, t o my way of
thinking, as unable to c ause itself as one c ontingent being. However, you say, I
t hink, t hat it is illegit imat e t o raise t he question of what will explain t he exist enc e of
any particular object.
Russell: It 's quit e all right if you mean by explaining it , simply finding a c ause for
it.
Copleston: Well, why stop at one partic ular objec t? Why shouldn't one raise the
question of the c ause of the existence of all particular objects?
Russell: Bec ause I see no reason to think there is any. The whole c onc ept of c ause
is one we derive from our observation of partic ular things; I see no reason
whatsoever to suppose that the total has any c ause whatsoever.
Copleston: Well, to say that there isn't any c ause is not the same thing as saying
that we shouldn't look for a c ause. The statement that there isn't any c ause should
c ome, if it c omes at all, at the end of the inquiry, not the beginning. In any c ase, if
the total has no c ause, then to my way of thinking it must be its own c ause, whic h
seems to me impossible. Moreover, the statement that the world is simply there if
in answer to a question, presupposes that the question has meaning.
Russell: No, it doesn't need to be its own c ause, what I'm saying is that the
concept of cause is not applicable to the total.
Copleston: Then you would agree with Sartre that the universe is what he c alls
"grat uit ous"?
Russell: Well, the word "gratuitous" suggests that it might be somet hing else; I
should say that the universe is just there, and that's all.
Copleston: Well, I c an't see how you c an rule out the legitimac y of asking the
question how the total, or anything at all c omes to be there. Why something rather
than nothing, that is the question? The fac t that we gain our knowledge of c ausality
empiric ally, from part ic ular c auses, does not rule out t he possibilit y of asking what
the cause of the series is. If the word "cause" were meaningless or if it could be
shown that Kant's view of the matter were correct, the question would be
illegitimate I agree; but you don't seem to hold that the word "cause" is
meaningless, and I do not suppose you are a Kantian.