Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in Religious Studies – Anthology
28Russell: I c an illust rat e what seems t o me your fallac y. Every man who exists has
a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human rac e
must have a mother, but obviously the human rac e hasn't a mother – that's a
different logic al sphere.
Copleston: Well, I c an't really see a parit y. If I were saying "every object has a
phenomenal cause, therefore, the whole series has a phenomenal cause," there
would be a parity; but I'm not saying that; I'm saying, every objec t has a
phenomenal c ause if you insist on the infinity of the series – but the series of
phenomenal causes is an insufficient explanation of the series. Therefore, the series
has not a phenomenal c ause but a transc endent c ause.
Russell: Well, that's always assuming that not only every partic ular thing in the
world, but the world as a whole must have a c ause. For that assumption I see no
ground what ever. If you'll give me a ground I will list en t o it.
Copleston: Well, the series of events is either caused or it's not caused. If it is
caused, there must obviously be a cause outside the series. If it's not c aused then
it 's suffic ient t o it self, and if it 's suffic ient t o it self, it is what I c all nec essary. But it
can't be necessary since each member is contingent, and we've agreed that the
total has no reality apart from the members, therefore, it can't be necessary.
Therefore, it can't be – unc aused – therefore it must have a cause. And I should
like t o observe in passing t hat t he st at ement "t he world is simply t here and is
inexplic able" c an't be got out of logic al analysis.
Russell: I don't want to seem arrogant, but it does seem to me that I can conceive
things that you say the human mind c an't c onc eive. As for things not having a
c ause, the physic ists assure us that individual quantum transitions in atoms have
no c ause.
Copleston: Well, I wonder now whether that isn't simply a temporary inferenc e.
Russell: It may be, but it does show that physic ists' minds c an c onc eive it.
Copleston: Yes, I agree, some scientists – physicists – are willing t o allow for
indet erminat ion wit hin a rest ric t ed field. But very many sc ient ist s are not so willing.
I think that Professor Dingle, of London University, maintains that the Heisenberg
unc ertainty princ iple tells us something about the suc c ess (or the lac k of it) of the
present at omic t heory in c orrelat ing observations, but not about nature in itself,
and many physic ists would ac c ept this view. In any c ase, I don't see how physic ists
c an fail to ac c ept the theory in prac tic e, even if they don't do so in theory.
I c annot see how sc ienc e c ould be c onduc ted on any other assumption than that of
order and int elligibilit y in nat ure. T he physic ist presupposes, at least t ac it ly, t hat
there is some sense in investigating nature and looking for the c auses of events,
just as the detective presupposes that there is some sense in looking for the c ause
of a murder. The metaphysic ian assumes that there is sense in looking for the
reason or c ause of phenomena, and, not being a Kantian, I c onsider that the
met aphysic ian is as just ified in his assumpt ion as t he physic ist. When Sart re, for
example, says the world is gratuitous, I think that he has not suffic iently c onsidered
what is implied by "grat uit ous."