220 Interpersonal Theory of Personality
encoding of the interpersonal bids proffered by the interac-
tants. Thus, all goes well, the interpersonal situation is re-
solved, and the relationship is stable. However, this is clearly
not always the case, as the previous example suggests. When
covert experience is inconsistent with the field-regulatory
bids communicated via overt behavior, it is our contention
that subjective experience takes precedence. That is, the
locus of complementarity is internal and covert experience is
influenced to a greater or lesser degree by enduring tenden-
cies to elaborate incoming data in particular ways. The qual-
ities of the individual that give rise to such tendencies have
yet to be well articulated within interpersonal theory. Inter-
personal theory can easily accommodate the notion that
individuals exhibit tendencies to organize their experience
in certain ways (i.e., they have particular interpersonal
schemas, expectancies, fantasies, etc.), but there has been
relatively little consensus on how these tendencies develop
and how they impact the contemporaneous interpersonal
situation.
The Problem of Complementarocentricity
Complementarocentricitycan be defined as the tendency to
place complementarity at the center of interpersonal theory
and research. In our opinion, this overemphasis has limited
the growth of theory. Three examples of complementarocen-
tricity are as follows:
1.What does failure to find empirical support for interper-
sonal complementarity mean? When empirical studies do
not confirm the existence of complementarity, investiga-
tors often label it “a failure to statistically support comple-
mentarity” (e.g., Orford, 1986). Even when empirical
investigations do find significant results (e.g., Gurtman,
2001), they are not indicative of 100% lawfulness. In our
opinion, the answer to our question is that other reciprocal
interpersonal patterns are also occurring in the interper-
sonal situation(s) under investigation.
2.In perhaps the most influential articulation of complemen-
tarity, Kiesler (1983) defined all reciprocal patterns in
relation to complementarity. That is, other forms of recip-
rocal interpersonal patterns are said to take either acom-
plementary or anticomplementary forms. We wonder if
this has inadvertently promoted complementarity as a
more fundamental reciprocal interpersonal pattern than it
actually should be.
3.In his encyclopedic review of complementarity theory and
research, Kiesler (1996) presented 11 propositions to
define and clarify the nature of, scope, and generizability
of complementarity, and nine counterpoints to Orford’s
(1986) famous critique of complementarity. In this work,
Kiesler summarized important contributions by many in-
terpersonalists emphasizing situational, personological,
and intrapsychic moderators of complementarity (e.g., see
Tracey, 1999), and suggested that significant attention be
directed toward articulating when and under what condi-
tions complementarity should and should not be expected
to occur. Although this is exceptionally important, it
continues to reflect complementarocentric thinking in that
what is not recognized is that Kiesler’s (1996) 11 proposi-
tions, nine counterpoints, and continuing investigation of
moderators serve to decentralizecomplementarity as the
fundamental reciprocal interpersonal pattern by suggest-
ing that its occurrence is more limited and contextualized.
For example, consider Proposition 11 regarding “appro-
priate situational parameters” from Kiesler (1996): “The
condition of complementarity is likely to obtain and be
maintained in a dyadic relationship only if the following
conditions are operative: a) the two participants are peers,
b) are of the same gender, c) the setting is unstructured,
and d) the situation is reactive (the possibility of recipro-
cal influence exists)” (p. 104). Considered alone, comple-
mentarity is thus suggested to be most applicable to
understanding the unstructured interactions of same-sex
peers. This is certainly important, but is perhaps not the
core phenomenon of interest for a comprehensive theory
of personality.The Problem of MotivationThe two core theoretical assertions associated with interper-
sonal complementarity are Sullivan’s theorem of reciprocal
emotion and Leary’s principle of reciprocal interpersonal re-
lations. With regard to the former, we suggest that interper-
sonal theorists have overemphasized Sullivan’s first point
(i.e., complementary needs are resolved or aggravated) and
underemphasized his second point (i.e., reciprocal patterns of
activity are developed or disintegrated). It is important to
note that the needs involved are left undefined, and that the
nature of satisfaction in the Sullivanian system involves a
global sense of felt security marked by the absence of
anxiety. Leary’s principle provided an important extension in
its emphasis on interpersonal influence and reinforcement
that shapes the nature of ongoing interpersonal situations.
But to what end? What is behavior’s purpose? Traditionally,
the cornerstone of complementarity has been the assertion
that behavior is enacted to invite self-confirming reciprocal
responses from others. We believe this has also been overem-
phasized in the interpersonal literature.