258 Social Cognition
In fact, as we shall see, many social-cognitive theories con-
sist of propositions that link representational assumptions
with particular processing tendencies that are assumed to be
inherent within the representational format.
In taking seriously the role of mental events in mediating
social behavior, social cognition theorists part company from
the radical behaviorists, who view the mind as a black box
having little if any theoretical relevance to an understanding
of the factors controlling and directing behavior. However,
the form of mentalism embodied in contemporary social cog-
nition research also parts company from the early structural-
ists, who took the data provided by introspection to be the
primary phenomena of psychological inquiry. Indeed, one of
the cornerstones of social cognition is the recognition that the
mind may be largely unaware of what it is doing; quite com-
monly, social perceivers may have very little introspective
access to the cognitive processes that give rise to their behav-
ioral reactions (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). These metatheoret-
ical commitments create some methodological challenges for
social cognition researchers of social cognition. On one hand,
it is assumed that mental events have central, causal impor-
tance in shaping social behavior. One the other hand, it is also
assumed that people may not be able to provide accurate self-
reports concerning the nature of these mental events. As a
result, social-cognitive researchers have devoted consider-
able effort to the development and adaptation of methodolo-
gies for studying mental processes that do not rely upon
introspection. Before commencing with our survey of social-
cognitive theory and research, we begin with a brief consid-
eration of the methodological underpinnings of this work.
The obvious difficulties of explicitly studying mental
events without falling prey to the potential biases and limita-
tions of self-report measures have led to innovations in both the
measurement and manipulation of social-cognitive processes.
Two broad classes of process measures that do not rely on
introspection have been developed. The first class consists of
chronometric techniques that measure the speed with which
a task can be performed (for a review, see Fazio, 1990). Build-
ing on classic chronometric methods for analyzing mental
processes (e.g., Donders, 1868; Sperling, 1960; Sternberg,
1966), these techniques bring the workings of the mind into the
scientific sphere by focusing on a directly observable property
of mental events (i.e., their duration). Through carefully con-
structed experimental situations, it becomes possible to use
participants’ response times to derive inferences about a num-
ber of theoretically important issues, such as determining the
nature of mental associations (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 2000)
and identifying the subsystems or component stages of a more
general process (e.g., Lingle & Ostrom, 1979). The second
class of process measures consists of techniques focusing on
memory performance (for a review, see Srull, 1984). Through
the study of aspects of performance such as omissions, intru-
sions, and the serial ordering of freely recalled material, or the
error rates observed in recognition memory, inferences can be
drawn concerning both mental structure and process (e.g.,
Jacoby, 1998; Srull, 1981). Techniques such as these do not
require any insight on the part of participants into the workings
of their own minds; moreover, they are unlikely to be influ-
enced by concerns about social desirability that can often
contaminate self-report data.
Another important methodological approach has involved
the development of experimental manipulations that are de-
signed either to activate or to interfere with hypothesized men-
tal structures, processes, or both (for a review, see Bargh &
Chartrand, 2000). For example, priming techniques can be
used to study nonconscious biases in social perception (e.g.,
Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Devine, 1989). In one version
of this kind of research, general concepts (such asBlacks) are
activated outside of perceivers’ conscious awareness, and the
consequences for social perception and memory are exam-
ined. If subsequent impressions of an ambiguous social target
are more in line with the subliminally activated concept (e.g.,
more stereotypical of African Americans), then one can con-
clude that stereotypical associations can be activated and ap-
plied in a manner that is automatic and unintentional. Along
similar lines, the imposition of secondary tasks can be used to
study the efficiency or the resource dependency of the mental
processes mediating social responses (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, &
Krull, 1988; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Rela-
tively automatic mental processes occur efficiently (i.e., they
do not require much in the way of attentional resources for
their successful deployment) and hence will not be disrupted
by the imposition of a secondary task. This very brief method-
ological sampler is merely meant to offer a taste of the general
spirit within which social cognition research is conducted. TheFigure 11.1 A schematic overview of the core assumptions of the social
cognition perspective.