260 Social Cognition
essence of whatever structures or processes actually do exist
within the neural architecture of the brain. Because re-
searchers have been able to account for a range of empirical
phenomena by reference to these kinds of mental structures—
and, indeed, have used their understanding of such structures
to generate novel empirical predictions about the phenomena
of social cognition—their hypothetical status has not been a
source of great tribulation. Nevertheless, as Smith (1998) has
pointed out, the metaphors that researchers use to understand
mental representation can have the undesirable side effect of
blinding them to important—even fundamental—properties
of the how the mind works. For this reason, it is important to
be cognizant of the background assumptions that underlie any
particular representational model and to reevaluate these as-
sumptions periodically.
Before considering the most prominent models of mental
representation (and many of their built-in assumptions), we
can begin by summarizing some of the common ground that is
shared by different theoretical approaches. First, all of the var-
ious theoretical approaches are in agreement that our subjec-
tive understanding of the social world consists ofsomesort
of organized representations, and that these representations,
whatever their nature, are definitely not merely veridical or ob-
jective renderings of reality. These representations are filtered
through the lens of each individual perceiver’s personality,
motivations, knowledge, and attitudes. As such, mental rep-
resentations are both more and less than a photographic record
of the social world. They are less than a photographic record
because they may fail to incorporate many aspects of the expe-
rienced world. Some features of the informational environ-
ment are selected for attention and subsequent processing, and
these features are likely to be incorporated into mental repre-
sentations of the relevant persons and events. However, many
other features are neglected and will consequently fail to be in-
cluded. On the other hand, the representations that are formed
are often more than a photographic record: They may go be-
yond the available data and incorporate aspects that were
never directly experienced—that is, perceivers may generate
inferences about otherwise unspecified characteristics of so-
cial targets and then incorporate these inferences within their
mental representations; indeed, they may subsequently be un-
able to distinguish between actual and inferred features. These
features of mental representation make it clear why it has as-
sumed the central role in social cognition research: It is impos-
sible to know what the person’s mental representation will
consist of simply by examining the stimulus input. After a rep-
resentation has been formed, it (and not the source information
from which it was originally derived) will be the crucial deter-
minant of observed reactions (e.g., Lingle & Ostrom, 1979;
Srull & Wyer, 1983).
A second universal assumption regarding mental repre-
sentation is the notion that new representations are inevitably
formed by referencing memory for relevant prior experiences
and knowledge. It is quite obvious that we would be hope-
lessly disoriented and quickly incapacitated if we had to treat
every stimulus that we encounter as a novel phenomenon
about which no preconceptions are available. Instead, we
rely on our memories to determine such crucially important
matters as how to interpret the meaning of different objects
and events and how to allocate our attention to different
aspects of the social environment. As such, our experience
of the present is always inexorably linked to past experi-
ences,as they are represented in memory.Clearly, what-
ever theoretical choices one might make in accounting for the
nature of mental representation, an understanding of the na-
ture and determinants of social memory will be absolutely
central to any complete account of the dynamics of social
cognition.
In an especially comprehensive and insightful review of the
models of mental representation that have been employed by
social psychologists, Smith (1998) identified four major
classes of hypothesized representational mechanisms: asso-
ciative networks, schemas, exemplars, and distributed (PDP)
models. In the next sections, we review each of these major ap-
proaches, highlighting their key assumptions and document-
ing the major phenomena that each approach has succeeded in
illuminating.Associative Network ModelsThe intellectual roots of associative network models lie in
British empiricism (especially Locke and Hume), with its
emphasis on the learning of simple associations between
sensations as the foundation from which all mental capacities
are presumed to arise. The associative network approach
assumes that mental representations consist of nodes of
information that are linked together in meaningful ways (e.g.,
Wyer & Carlston, 1994). For example, a mental representa-
tion of a person named George could consist of various
concepts that are associated with him, such as personality
traits, occupational roles, physical appearance, and so on.
Each attribute would constitute one node, and each node
would be connected to a central organizing node via links.
The strength of these links is hypothesized to vary; if certain
attributes were especially strongly associated with George,
for example, then the links connecting these attributes to the
central one would be especially strong ones. The structural
assumptions of this approach could thus hardly be simpler:
Representations consist simply of nodes that are intercon-
nected via links that vary in strength.