Attitude Formation 311Bassili (1996) proposed a distinction between “operative”
and “meta-attitudinal” measures of attitude strength. Opera-
tive measures reflect ongoing processes that are related to
attitude strength, whereas meta-attitudinal measures reflect
the individual’s conscious judgments about qualities that
are related to the strength of his or her attitude. For example,
response latency is an operative measure—it unobtrusively
reveals the accessibility of the evaluation (one feature of
attitude strength). In contrast, a subjective judgment of the
importance of the attitude is a meta-attitudinal measure—it
reflects a conscious judgment about a strength-related fea-
ture. In two studies, operative and meta-attitudinal measures
of attitude strength were obtained from participants and used
to predict resistance to influence and stability (two presumed
consequences of attitude strength). Results showed that the
operative measures predicted the criteria better than did
the meta-attitudinal measures. Bassili concluded that opera-
tive measures of attitude strength are more valid than meta-
attitudinal measures.
ATTITUDE FORMATION
Where do attitudes come from? How do they develop? As de-
scribed in the earlier section on attitude structure, attitudes
can be based on cognitive, affective, and behavioral informa-
tion. Each of these possible avenues of attitude formation is
discussed in the following section; a biological perspective
on attitude formation is also introduced.
It is important to note that the psychological processes
involved in attitude formation can also lead to attitude
change (i.e., the alteration of an existing attitude to a differ-
ent evaluative position), and that theories of attitude forma-
tion are also theories of attitude change. Because there is
another chapter in this volume dedicated entirely to attitude
change (see the chapter by Petty in this volume), we de-
scribe the mechanisms involved in attitude formation only
briefly here.
Cognitive Processes
One crucial source of attitudes is cognitive information about
the target—that is, beliefs about the attributes of the target.
Indeed, as discussed in the section of this chapter on attitude
structure, beliefs play a prominent role in both major models
of attitude content. Knowledge about an object can come
either from direct experience with the object or from indirect
sources such as parents, peers, and the media. As already
noted, attitudes based on direct experience tend to be stronger
than are attitudes derived from indirect information.
The best-known theory of attitude formation based on
cognitive beliefs is thetheory of reasoned action(Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975), which is an expectancy-value model in which
salient (i.e., highly accessible) beliefs are hypothesized to
combine additively to form the overall evaluation of the tar-
get (attitude toward the target). As noted earlier in the chap-
ter, many researchers have documented a strong relation
between attitudes and expectancy-value products (e.g.,
Budd, 1986; van der Pligt & de Vries, 1998). This model of
attitudes is based on a conception of humans as rational, de-
liberate thinkers who base their attitudes and behavior on in-
formation about the positive and negative consequences of
various actions.Affective ProcessesIndividuals’ evaluations of targets can also be based on how
the target makes them feel—that is, on the emotions or affect
aroused by the target. Indeed, as noted in this chapter’s sec-
tion on attitude structure, affect sometimes predicts attitudes
better than does cognition (e.g., see Esses et al., 1993). Of
course, affect and cognition are often (or even usually) con-
sistent with one another because these processes are mutually
interdependent (e.g., knowledge can influence feelings, and
feelings can guide thoughts).
Although affect toward objects can spring from beliefs
about those objects, there are a number of processes that can
result in affect’s becoming associated with an object inde-
pendently of cognition (i.e., independently of information
about the characteristics of the object). These processes are
discussed in detail in the section entitled “Low-Effort
Attitude Change Processes” in the chapter on attitude change
(see the chapter by Petty in this volume), so we only mention
them here briefly. One process is classical conditioning,
which occurs when a stimulus comes to evoke a response
that it did not previously evoke, simply by being paired
with another stimulus that already evokes that response. For
example, the receptionist at a dental office might come to
evoke negative affect for patients who are very fearful of den-
tal work. Although a conditioning perspective on attitudes
has been around for many years in social psychology (e.g.,
Staats & Staats, 1958), the past decade has continued to see
very sophisticated studies documenting conditioning effects
on attitudes (e.g., Cacioppo, Marshall-Goodell, Tassinary, &
Petty, 1992).
A second process through which affect can become linked
to objects without necessary cognitive mediation is mere ex-
posure. The mere exposure effect(Zajonc, 1968) occurs when
repeated, simple exposure to an object (i.e., exposure without
reinforcement feedback) leads to more favorable feelings