Relatively High-Effort Processes of Attitude Change 365
A number of factors have been proposed to account for the
relatively low correlation between attitude change and infor-
mation recall. One argument, for example, has been that
simple learning theories do not account for the fact that dif-
ferent people form different evaluations of information con-
tained in persuasive messages—that is, although one person
may be convinced by an argument, someone else might find it
to be ludicrous (see Petty, Ostrom, et al., 1981). Yet both
might be able to recall the argument. Attitude change has been
found to correspond more closely with information recall
when individuals’ unique assessments of the information
recalled is accounted for (Chattopadhyay & Alba, 1988).
Furthermore, attitudes have been found to correlate more
strongly with learning and recall when people are not evaluat-
ing information on-line at the time of exposure. For example,
when processing is made difficult (e.g., Bargh & Thein, 1985;
Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987), when people are given
nonevaluative processing goals (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh,
1996; Hastie & Park, 1986; Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987;
Mackie & Asuncion, 1990), or when they are the type of
people who do not spontaneously engage in evaluation (low
in theirneed to evaluate;Tormala & Petty, 2001), the attitude-
recall correlation is higher. Under these conditions, when peo-
ple are asked to report their attitudes, they are forced to first
retrieve what they can from memory, and then base their atti-
tudes on the evaluative implications of this information.
Cognitive Response Approach
Following a series of early findings that attitude change and
information recall were not consistently related, researchers
developed the cognitive response approach to persuasion
(e.g., Brock, 1967; Greenwald, 1968; Petty, Ostrom, et al.,
1981). According to this approach, attitudes and message
argument recall are not always related because persuasion
typically depends largely on an individual’s idiosyncratic
thoughts in response to a persuasive message (i.e., thoughts
about message arguments or other factors such as the tone,
source, or context of the message). According to the cognitive
response view, when exposed to a persuasive message, peo-
ple reflect on the message with respect to their preexisting
knowledge and prior attitude (if they have one), considering
information not contained in the message itself. Three aspects
of people’s cognitive responses have proven important.
Extent of Thought
First, investigators have explored determinants of the extent
of issue-relevant thinking. As noted earlier in our discussion
of the elaboration likelihood model, a number of variables
have been found to affect how much people are motivated
(e.g., personal relevance) or able (e.g., distraction) to think
about a persuasive communication.
Content of Thought
Another aspect of thinking that has garnered considerable re-
search attention is the content of thought. Perhaps the most
important dimension in this regard is the overall valence of
the thinking that occurs. Researchers typically categorize
thoughts as favorable, unfavorable, or neutral, and then com-
pute an overall valence index (e.g., positive thoughts minus
negative thoughts; see Mackie, 1987). According to the cog-
nitive response approach, persuasion can be increased to the
extent that the message elicits mostly favorable thoughts
(e.g.,If we raise taxes, the roads will improve and reduce my
commute time) and few unfavorable thoughts (e.g., If we
raise taxes, I’ll have less money to go out to dinner). On the
other hand, people can resist messages to the extent that they
generate mostly unfavorable thoughts and few favorable
thoughts.
As noted earlier, people can be motivated to generate par-
ticular thoughts by external variables such as their mood
(Petty et al., 1993) or the message source (Chaiken &
Maheswaran, 1994). In a series of studies on resistance to
change, McGuire (1964) demonstrated that counterarguing
of persuasive messages could be increased by giving people
weak attacking messages prior to a stronger attack. The un-
derlying logic of this inoculation approach to resistance is
that a small dose of an attacking virus (i.e., a weak challenge
to the person’s attitude that is refuted) motivates the person to
build up antibodies (i.e., counterarguments) that can be used
against subsequent attacks. Even if an exact defense is not
anticipated, people are presumably motivated by the inocula-
tion treatment (i.e., the initial attack and refutation) to defend
their attitudes by counterarguing opposition messages in the
future. Recent research has shown that having people experi-
ence a successful defense of their attitudes can produce
greater confidence in the initial attitude. This enhanced confi-
dence renders the attitude not only more resistant to change
in the future, but also more predictive of future behavior
(Tormala & Petty, in press).
Confidence in Thoughts
In addition to extent and content of thinking, recent research
has uncovered a third aspect of thought that influences
persuasion—the confidence people have in their own cognitive
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