Manipulation 395affection, self-disclosures, offers of assistance, and birthday
gifts went unreciprocated (cf. Lerner & Mikula, 1994). There
are two complications here, however. First, the partners to a
relationship are not always equally invested in or dependent
on the relationship (e.g., Rusbult & Martz, 1995). In terms of
social exchange theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut &
Kelley, 1959), the comparison level for alternatives (CLalt)
for each partner may be substantially different, and this dif-
ferential dependency can promote exploitative behavior by
the less dependent person. In effect, the person who feels
more confident that he or she could establish desirable alter-
native relationships (i.e., the person with the higher CLalt) can
set the terms of exchange in the relationship. This power
asymmetry need not be discussed explicitly in order for it to
promote inequality in overt expressions of affection, the allo-
cation of duties and responsibilities, and decision making.
The second complication arises in relationships that
achieve a certain threshold of closeness. Intimate partners are
somewhat loathe to think about their union in economic, tit-
for-tat terms, preferring instead to emphasize the communal
aspect of their relationship (cf. M. S. Clark & Mills, 1979).
They feel they operate on the basis of need rather than equity
or reciprocity, and this perspective enables them to make sac-
rifices for one another without expecting compensation or re-
payment. The apparent suspension of reciprocity may be
more apparent than real, however. The issue is not reciproc-
ity per se, but rather the time scale on which reciprocity and
other exchange metrics are calculated. What looks like self-
less and unrequited sacrifice by one person in the short run
can be viewed as inputs that are eventually compensated by
the other person in one form or another (cf. Foa & Foa,
1974). Depending on the sacrifice (e.g., fixing dinner vs. tak-
ing on a second job), the time scale for repayment can vary
considerably (e.g., hours or days vs. weeks or even years),
but at some point the scales need to be balanced. The sense
that one has been treated unfairly or exploited—or simply
that one’s assistance and affection have not been duly
reciprocated—can ultimately spoil a relationship and bring
about its dissolution.
Commitment
Although it is not usually listed as a social norm, commitment
can influence behavior as much as do reciprocity, equity, re-
sponsibility, and other basic social rules and expectations
(Kiesler, 1971). After people have committed themselves to
an opinion or course of action, it is difficult for them to
change their minds, recant, or otherwise fail to stay the
course. Commitment does not derive its power solely from
the anger and disappointment that breaking of a commitment
would engender in others—although this certainly counts for
something—but also from a basic desire to act consistently
with one’s point of view. A commitment that is expressed
publicly, whether in front of a crowd or to a single individual,
is especially effective in locking in a person’s opinion or
promise, making it resistant to change despite the availability
of good reasons for reconsideration (cf. Deutsch & Gerard,
1955; Schlenker, 1980).
Agents of influence play on this seemingly noble ten-
dency, often for decidedly nonnoble purposes of their own.
Several specific techniques have been observed in real-world
settings and confirmed in research (Cialdini & Trost, 1998).
Perhaps the best-known tactic is referred to as the foot-in-the-
door,which is essentially the mirror image of the door-in-the-
face tactic. Rather than starting out with a large request and
then appearing to make a concession by making a smaller re-
quest, the foot-in-the-door specialist begins with a minor
request that is unlikely to meet with resistance. After securing
committing with this request, the influence agent ups the
ante by making a far more costly request that is consistent
with the initial request. Because of commitment concerns, it
can be very difficult at this point for the target to refuse com-
pliance. A series of clever field experiments (Freedman &
Fraser, 1966) provide compelling evidence for the effective-
ness of this tactic. In one study, suburban housewives were
contacted and asked to do something that most of them (78%)
refused to do: allow a team of six men from a consumer
group to come into their respective homes for 2 hours to
“enumerate and classify all the household products you
have.” Another group of housewives was contacted and pre-
sented with a much less inconvenience-producing request—
simply answering a few questions about their household
soaps (e.g., “What brand of soap do you use in your kitchen
sink?”). Nearly everyone complied with this minor request.
These women were contacted again three days later, but this
time with the larger home-visit request. In this case, over
half the women (52%) complied with the request and allowed
the men to rummage through their closets and cupboards for
2 hours.
The commitment process underlying this tactic goes be-
yond the target’s concern with maintaining consistency with
the action per se. It also engages the target’s self-concept with
respect to the values made salient by the action. Thus, the
women who complied with the initial request in the Freedman
and Fraser (1966) studies were presumably sensitized to their
self-image as helpful, public-spirited individuals. To maintain
consistency with this suddenly salient (and perhaps newly
enhanced) self-image, they felt compelled to comply with
the later, more invasive request. Assuming this to be the case,
the foot-in-the-door tactic holds potential for influencing