398 Social Influence and Group Dynamics
reality rather than concerns with acceptance, rejection, and
the like. Sherif felt that groups provide important information
for individuals—and more important, interpretative frame-
works for making coherent judgments about information.
People have a need for cognitive clarity (Schachter, 1959),
but sometimes they lack an objective yardstick for determin-
ing the true nature of their experiences. In such instances,
people turn to others, not to gain approval but rather to obtain
social clues to reality. People are highly prone to rumors, for
example, even from unreliable sources, when they hear about
goings-on for which no official explanation has been pro-
vided. A sudden noise or a hard-to-read message can simi-
larly make people prone to the assessments of others in an
attempt to clarify what has happened.
To test this motivation for conformity, Sherif (1936)
needed a situation in which the physical environment lacked
ready-made yardsticks for understanding, so that the opera-
tion of social standards could be observed. His solution was
to take advantage of the autokinetic effect—the apparent
motion of a stationary spot of light in a dark room. The idea
was to place a group of participants in this type of situation
and ask them to make estimates of the light’s movement. Par-
ticipants, of course, were not informed that the light’s move-
ment was illusory. When tested individually, participants
varied considerably in their estimates, from virtually no
movement to more than 10 inches. He then brought together
three participants who had previously made estimates in pri-
vate, and asked them to announce their individual judgments
aloud and in succession. Despite their initial differences, par-
ticipants converged fairly quickly (often within three trials)
on a single estimate that functioned as a group standard for
the light’s movement. Sherif went on to show that after a
group defined reality for participants, they continued to ad-
here to the group judgment even after they left the group (see
also Alexander, Zucker, & Brody, 1970).
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) recognized that people can
conform for different reasons and formally distinguished be-
tweennormative influence,which captures the essence of the
Asch situation, and informational influence,which reflects
participants’ motivation in the Sherif situation. Normative in-
fluence refers to conformity in an attempt to gain approval,
whereas informational influence refers to conformity in an at-
tempt to gain clear knowledge about reality. Sometimes it is
difficult to determine which basis of conformity is operative
in a given situation. Imagine, for example, that you observe
someone following the lead of others at a classical music
concert. When they sit, he or she sits. When they give a stand-
ing ovation, the person follows suit. The group influence in
this case could be normative, informational, or perhaps both,
depending on the person’s primary source of uncertainty. If
the person is unsure of his or her standing among the fellow
concert-goers, the person’s conformity could be driven by de-
sires for approval or fears of ridicule. If the person is unfa-
miliar with classical music, however, the behavior of others
might provide all-important clues about the quality of the
performance.
Normative influence is especially salient when the group
controls material or psychological rewards important to the
person (e.g., Crutchfield, 1955), when the behavior is public
rather than private (e.g., Insko, Drenan, Solomon, Smith, &
Wade, 1983), or when the person is especially eager for
approval (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). Someone attending
the concert with prospective colleagues, for instance, may
be especially inclined to match their behavior, particularly
if he or she is uncertain about their interest in his or her
job candidacy and the concert hall has good lighting. The
salience of informational influence in turn depends on
the person’s confidence in his or her own judgment, and on
the person’s judgment of how well-informed the group is.
Thus, a classical music neophyte who sees tuxedo-clad audi-
ence members leap to their feet upon completion of the Rach
3 (Rachmaninoff’s third piano concerto) is more likely to fol-
low suit than if he or she instead sees the same behavior by
school children. A graduate of Julliard, meanwhile, is un-
likely to mimic such behavior in either case. Informational
influence tends also to take precedence, not surprisingly,
when the judgment task is particularly difficult or ambiguous
(e.g., Coleman, Blake, & Mouton, 1958). Even in the Asch
situation, conformity is increased when the lines are closer in
length and thus harder to judge (Asch, 1952), and when judg-
ments are made from memory rather than from direct percep-
tion of the lines (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), presumably
because our memories are considered more fallible than are
our immediate perceptions.GroupthinkConformity clearly serves important functions, but like every
other adaptation, there are downsides as well. A particularly
troublesome aspect of conformity isgroupthink(Janis, 1982).
Janis borrowed this term from George Orwell’s 1984 to refer
to a mode of thinking dominated by a concern for reaching
and maintaining consensus, as opposed to making the best
decision under the circumstances. Groupthink essentially
entails “a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing,
and moral judgment that results from group pressure” (Janis,
1982, p. 9). Rather than examining all possible courses of
action, people in the grips of groupthink expend their mental
energy on achieving and maintaining group solidarity and
opinion unanimity.