458 Close Relationships
Thus, we have acquired and reported evidence consistent
with the notion that the existence of inequities in a marriage
will not necessarily lead to distress. We have also acquired
and reported evidence consistent with the notions that dis-
tress might be what triggers contingent record keeping and
perceptions of unfairness. We do not yet have hard empirical
evidence that there are individual differences in people’s ten-
dencies to feel that their needs have been neglected and, in
turn, to switch from adherence to a communal norm to adher-
ence to some sort of record keeping, contingent, distributive
justice norm. However, we are currently collecting and be-
ginning to analyze data relevant to just that question.
Permanent or Temporary Switches?
A final issue we wish to address in this chapter is whether the
change will be permanent or temporary once people switch
from a communal to a contingent, record-keeping norm for
distributing benefits within their relationship. We propose
that most such switches will be temporary. These changes
will occur when a person is dissatisfied with how a relation-
ship is going, wishes to ensure that his or her needs are met
by the partner, and (not incidentally) wishes to signal his or
her distress to the partner. Indeed, communicatingdisplea-
sure may be just as important a motivator of the switch as is
ensuring that one gets what one wants. Once the switch has
been made and communicated, the protest function of having
done so is largely accomplished. So, too, may the person
have accomplished the short-term goal of having one imme-
diate need addressed.
However, once a contingent, record-keeping distributive
justice norm begins to be used, all the disadvantages of fol-
lowing such a norm will emerge. That is, record keeping will
have to be done. It is tedious; it is virtually impossible to do
competently; and given all the sorts of biases already dis-
cussed in this chapter, there will inevitably be disagreements
over whether equity, equality, or fair exchange have been
achieved. Moreover, the advantages of following a communal
norm will evaporate. The recipient of benefits will not feel that
the other cares for him or her, and the donor of benefits will not
derive satisfaction for having nurtured a partner. These things
combined with the strong societal norm that communal rules
ought to characterize marriages and other close relationships
will combine to push couples back to following a communal
norm. Moreover, stresses in relationships themselves will
often dissipate, and reminders of a partner’s true caring atti-
tudes will reemerge. Thus, we would predict that couples will
often bounce back to using communal norms.
On the other hand, there should also be cases when cou-
ples do not bounce back. Chronic neglect of at least one
partner’s needs by the other may predict this. So too may
either partner’s long-term, pessimistic views of the likelihood
of the other being caring (and of the self being worthy of
care) predict such a lack of resilience. These two things, in
combination, may be especially likely to predict that a switch
to contingent norms will be longer term. Such a switch, as we
have already noted, is unlikely to constitute a satisfying solu-
tion. Therefore, we believe that it will likely be followed by a
further switch to purely self-interested behavior or to the dis-
solution of the relationship. Whether the relationship persists
long term (and perhaps happily), given the use of contingent
record-keeping norms, or whether it ends will depend on the
presence or absence of the sorts of barriers to leaving that in-
terdependence theorists have discussed. That is, having poor
alternatives, high investments, and feeling prescriptions
against leaving are factors likely to keep couples together de-
spite giving and receiving benefits on what we consider to be
nonoptimal bases. Good alternatives, low investments, and
low prescriptions to leaving are likely to predict relationship
dissolution.CONCLUSIONSIn this chapter we described what we believe to be the char-
acteristics of a high-quality friendship, dating relationship,
marriage, or family relationship. We suggested that quality
ought not be defined in terms of stability, satisfaction, or con-
flict but rather in terms of the presence of interpersonal
processes that facilitate the well-being of its members. We
also suggested that members ought to agree implicitly on the
degree of responsiveness to needs that is expected in the rela-
tionship and that relationships can go bad not only if respon-
siveness to needs is not present when expected but also if it is
present when it is not called for.
Next we pointed out that viewing close relationships in this
way suggests taking a new approach to understanding the use
(and nonuse) of contingent, record-keeping distributive jus-
tice norms in intimate relationships. In well-functioning inti-
mate relationships people should respond to one another’s
needs in a noncontingent fashion as those needs arise. Record
keeping should not be an issue, and fairness should not be dis-
cussed. Fairness simply should not be a salient issue for people
in such relationships. (Of course, if some social scientist
comes along and asks participants to judge the fairness of the
giving and receiving of benefits in that relationship, we have
no doubt that members will come up with such ratings. We just
do not think they do this spontaneously on their own.) Mem-
bers of such relationships appear to be following a communal
rule, and we believe that following such a rule promotes a
sense of intimacy, security, and well-being in the relationship.