464 Altruism and Prosocial Behavior
pleading screams, no one intervened; no one even called the
police. More heartening were the courageous acts of Freedom
Riders and other civil rights workers, Black and White, who
suffered beatings, imprisonment, and in some cases death to
further the cause of racial equality in the American South.
Youth were in the streets to protest the Vietnam War and to
proclaim the dawning of the Age of Aquarius. The times they
were a-changin’. Social psychologists were asked, Why do—
and don’t—people act prosocially?
Before attempting to offer an answer to this question, one
should probably inquire of the questioner, “Why do you ask?”
This response is necessary because the question has been
asked for two very different reasons. Some have asked in
order to reach the practical goal of encouraging prosocial be-
havior; others, in order to challenge currently dominant theo-
ries of social motivation. The dominant motivational theories
in psychology, sociology, economics, and political science
are firmly founded on assumptions of universal egoism
(Mansbridge, 1990; Wallach & Wallach, 1983). Can one ac-
count for all prosocial behavior in terms of egoism, or must
one make room for altruism as well? Might there be other
forms of prosocial motivation besides egoism and altruism?
These two reasons for asking why people act prosocially
beg for very different answers. So, if one is not clear which
reason lies behind the question, the answer provided may
appear irrelevant and the research on which it is based mis-
guided. To avoid such confusion, this chapter addresses the
two concerns in turn—first the practical, then the theoretical.
VARIANCE-ACCOUNTED-FOR
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Psychologists pursuing the practical concern of promoting
prosocial behavior usually employ one of two strategies: (a) a
variance-accounted-for empirical analysis or (b) application
and extension of existing social psychological theory. One
view of science that has long been popular among psy-
chologists, especially psychologists with an applied orien-
tation, is empirical prediction and control. From this
perspective, promoting prosocial behavior requires, first,
identification of its most powerful predictors. Then one can
engage in social engineering, creating an environment that
optimizes these predictors and, thereby, prosocial behavior.
The logic seems straightforward. Its apparent simplicity has,
however, proved deceptive.
Dispositional Versus Situational Determinants
Operating with an implicit variance-accounted-for model, sev-
eral investigators around 1970 attempted to determine whether
dispositional or situational factors were better predictors of
prosocial behavior. The dispositional variables studied include
anomie, authoritarianism, autonomy, deference, intelligence,
Machiavellianism, nurturance, religiosity, self-esteem, social
desirability, social responsibility, submissiveness, and succo-
rance. Not one of these, by itself, was a clear predictor. In con-
trast, situational factors—ambiguity of need, severity of need,
physical appearance of victim, similarity to victim, friendship,
number of bystanders, location (urban vs. rural), cost of help-
ing, and so on—seemed powerful. These results led several
reviewers (e.g., Huston & Korte, 1976; J. A. Piliavin, Dovidio,
Gaertner, & Clark, 1981) to conclude that situational variables
are better predictors of prosocial behavior than are disposi-
tional variables.
Soon, however, this conclusion was challenged as part of
the general counterattack by personality researchers against
situationist critiques. Staub (1974) found that an aggregate
dispositional measure, a prosocial orientation index (combin-
ing measures of feelings of personal responsibility, social
responsibility, moral reasoning, prosocial values, and a low
level of Machiavellianism), was a reasonably good predictor
of helping across several different measures. Rushton (1980)
reanalyzed previous research (notably, the classic studies by
Hartshorne and May in the late 1920s) by computing aggre-
gate measures of prosocial behavior and found far better evi-
dence of cross-situation consistency than had analyses based
on individual measures.
Other researchers pointed to the greater predictive poten-
tial of dispositional factors for the higher cost, nonsponta-
neous, longer term helping that occurs in the natural stream of
behavior outside the psychological laboratory. For example,
Oliner and Oliner (1988) conducted a major study using inter-
views and questionnaires to identify predictors of acting to
rescue Jews in Nazi Europe. They claimed evidence for the
predictive power of three dispositional factors: (a) a proclivity
to feel empathy for those in need, (b) sensitivity to normative
pressure from social groups, and (c) adherence to inclusive,
universal moral principles such as justice or care. Presumably,
better prediction is possible outside the laboratory because the
more reflective decision process involved in planned (non-
spontaneous) helping permits more chance for personal val-
ues, attitudes, and dispositions to come into play.
Still other researchers argued that it was an oversimplifi-
cation to expect a personality variable to relate to helping in
all situations. Many pointed to the greater success of predict-
ing prosocial behavior using disposition-situation interac-
tions (e.g., Romer, Gruder, & Lizzardo, 1986). For example,
self-confidence and independence seem to correlate with
helping in emergency situations, especially dangerous ones,
but not in response to a request to contribute to the United
Way (Wilson, 1976). Snyder and Ickes (1985) suggested that