Application and Extension of Existing Theory 469appear to be far more predictive of whether a person will give
blood than are statements of agreement with broad social
norms like the norm of social responsibility—at least if the
person in question is one who believes in acting responsibly
(Schwartz & Howard, 1981). Specific statements like this are
particularly powerful as predictors when one also takes into
account extenuating circumstances, such as whether an indi-
vidual was in town during the blood drive, had no major
scheduling conflicts, and was physically able to give blood
(Zuckerman & Reis, 1978). At this level of specificity, how-
ever, it is not clear whether the statement about giving blood
reflects a sense of personal obligation stemming from an in-
ternalized rule of conduct (i.e., a personal norm) or simply an
intention to act in a particular way.
Exchange or Equity
Perhaps the most direct extension of social learning princi-
ples into interpersonal relations is exchange or equity theory.
When developing exchange theory, Homans (1961) explic-
itly and proudly declared his agenda to be the reduction of
social relations—including cooperation, helping, and other
prosocial behaviors—to reinforcement principles operating
within the individual. Equity theorists were not so reduction-
ist. They considered social relations to have emergent prop-
erties that were irreducible to the benefits and costs for the
individuals involved. In their view, social learning teaches
one to value equitable relations, in which the ratio of out-
comes to inputs is equal for the relating individuals. Walster,
Berscheid, and Walster (1973) claimed that equity theory was
a general theory that subsumed social learning theory (and
psychoanalytic theory). Although this may seem a myopic
inversion, equity theory does add an important dimension to
the understanding of prosocial behavior by introducing both
social comparison and distributive justice. Needs and bene-
fits are no longer defined by looking at the individual alone;
the definition is broadened to include needs based on relative
deprivation (Adams, 1965).
Homans (1961) pointed out that if a recipient of help can-
not return the favor in a tangible way, then he or she must re-
turn esteem and deference. Otherwise, the relationship will
not remain beneficial to both parties and thus will not con-
tinue. Walster et al. (1973) argued that not only the relatively
underbenefited but also the relatively overbenefited are moti-
vated to restore equity (although they acknowledged that
inequity in one’s favor is more tolerable than the reverse).
Acting prosocially to redistribute resources more fairly is one
way to restore equity—but only one. Equity may also be re-
stored psychologically by enhancing the perceived inputs of
the advantaged or devaluing the inputs of the disadvantaged,
thereby justifying the difference in outcomes.
AttributionAttribution theory concerns inferences drawn about the
causes of events (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965). Attri-
butions can affect prosocial behavior in two major ways.
First, attributions about why a person is in need are made not
only by potential helpers and bystanders but also by the per-
son in need, with consequences for each. Second, attributions
about the character of a person who helps are made not only
by the helpers themselves but also by the persons helped,
again with consequences for each.Attributing the Cause of Others’ NeedsPeople are far more likely to help innocent victims than to
help those who bring their troubles on themselves (Weiner,
1980). Although this relationship is no surprise, the reason
for it is not entirely clear. Perhaps causing one’s own need (or
not working to prevent it) violates ingrained standards for
self-sufficiency and prudence; perhaps causing one’s own
need but not suffering the consequences violates our sense of
justice; perhaps it seems inequitable to those who perceive
themselves to have exerted effort to avoid need. In any case,
peopleareless likely to help those who bring their troubles
on themselves, even though the explanation for this behavior
has never been carefully explored.Attributing the Cause of One’s Own NeedPeople in need may be predisposed to attribute their need to
situational causes, as something thrust upon them by un-
avoidable circumstances and carrying no implications about
personal ability or worth. This attribution may, however, be
hard to sustain when the need is produced by failure on a task
that one expected to perform successfully, especially when
comparable peers succeed (Fisher, Nadler, & Whitcher-
Alagna, 1982). To avoid an esteem-damaging dispositional
attribution, the person in need may attempt to deny the failure
and not seek or appreciate help (Nadler, 1991).Attributing the Cause of HelpHelpers make attributions about the nature and cause not only
of others’ needs but also of their own helping. A helper may
ask, “Why did I help in this situation?” Possible answers in-
clude the following: (a) because I am a kind, caring, helpful
person—a dispositional attribution likely to be self-rewarding
and encourage one to help in a range of situations in the
future; (b) because I am the kind of person who helps in this
particular situation (e.g., I am a blood donor; J. A. Piliavin,
Callero, & Evans, 1982)—a dispositional attribution likely to