Application and Extension of Existing Theory 471might act to benefit another as problems or puzzles to be
solved, much like the problems in volume conservation that
Piaget gave his children. The key to prosocial action is the
level of moral reasoning used to solve the puzzle or dilemma.
In Kohlberg’s (1976) words, “To act in a morally high way
requires a high stage of moral reasoning.... Moral stage is a
good predictor of action” (p. 32).
Kohlberg claimed to have identified a universal and in-
variant sequence of six stages in moral reasoning, grouped in
pairs into three levels: (a) preconventional (judgment based
on immediate consequences for self), (b) conventional (judg-
ment based on social norms, rules, and laws), and (c) post-
conventional (judgment based on universal moral principles
that at once transcend and undergird the moral conventions of
society). The moral principle that Kohlberg considered most
important was a neo-Kantian principle of justice whereby
each individual is accorded equal rights and dignity in a
Kingdom of Ends.
Controversy has surrounded moral reasoning theories
from the start. First, evidence that moral reasoning develops
universally in the invariant sequence of stages that Kohlberg
described is equivocal at best (Kurtines & Greif, 1974). Sec-
ond, the link between level of moral reasoning and prosocial
behavior is far less clear than one might expect (Blasi, 1980;
Eisenberg, 1991). In defense, supporters of moral reasoning
models have pointed out that (a) adequate measurement of
moral reasoning is difficult and (b) in almost any moral
dilemma one may justify a given course of action in different
ways, using different levels of moral reasoning. Both points
seem true, but they reduce the explanatory power of moral
reasoning theories, casting doubt on Kohlberg’s claim that
moral stage is a good predictor of prosocial action. Modified
models of moral reasoning that incorporate social learning
principles offer better explanatory power (e.g., Eisenberg,
1986). One must ask of these models, however, whether the
social learning principles do all the explanatory work.
In addition to being challenged from outside by re-
searchers who question the value of moral reasoning as a suf-
ficient or even necessary explanation of prosocial behavior,
Kohlberg’s focus on justice as the capstone of moral maturity
has been challenged from inside the moral-reasoning camp.
The most notable challenge has come from his former student
and colleague Carol Gilligan. In addition to an ethic of justice
and fairness, Gilligan (1982) called for recognition of an
ethic of care. Although she believed that both men and
women display reasoning based on justice and reasoning
based on care, she claimed that the former is more character-
istic of men and the latter more characteristic of women. She
also claimed that Kohlberg’s exclusive focus on justice led
to a perception that men are superior to women in moral
reasoning. Finally, she claimed that this apparent superiority
will disappear if one listens to the moral voice of women,
who speak more of care than of justice.
Evidence for the claimed sex difference in use of per-
spectives of justice and care has been limited and weak
(Walker, 1991). But research has supported Gilligan’s claim
that moral dilemmas can be approached from a perspective
of care rather than justice (Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988;
Walker, 1991). It remains unclear, however, what a care per-
spective is. Is it (a) a reflection of Kohlberg’s conventional
stage of morality, (b) an alternative mode of moral reasoning
with its own developmental sequence, or (c) not a form of
moral reasoning at all but an emotional reaction or bond?
In sum, although the distinction between justice and care
seems to have value, considerably more conceptual preci-
sion is needed to know the nature and significance of this
distinction.Amalgamated ModelsOne need not rely on just one of these seven theoretical per-
spectives to explain prosocial behavior. It is possible to in-
voke more than one in a given situation or to invoke one in
one situation and another in a different situation. It is also
possible to combine perspectives into an amalgamated
model. Sometimes, such an amalgamation has been created
by the integration of different theoretical perspectives (e.g.,
social learning and norm theories); more often, it has resulted
from arranging perspectives in sequence, adding boxes and
arrows to a flowchart of steps that lead ultimately to prosocial
behavior. The impetus for creating amalgamated models
seems to be the desire to be comprehensive, a desire that
stems from the same aspirations for prediction and control
that underlie the more ad hoc variance-accounted-for ap-
proach. But in amalgamated models, this desire takes advan-
tage of existing theories to pull together and organize a range
of explanations.
Perhaps the best known and most enduring amalgamated
model is the arousal/cost-reward model originally proposed
by I. M. Piliavin, Rodin, and Piliavin (1969) and devel-
oped and elaborated by J. A. Piliavin et al. (1981), Dovidio
(1984), and Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, and
Clark (1991). Originally, this model combined a tension-
reduction motivational component with a cost-reward assess-
ment of the various behavioral means to reduce the tension.
Over the years, norms, equity concerns, and attribution
processes have been incorporated as well, producing a flow-
chart with 8 boxes and 17 arrows that is too complex to
describe here. Other amalgamated models include those de-
veloped by Bar-Tal (1982), who relies most heavily on social