Anomalous Prosocial Acts 477group identity (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Tajfel, 1981; Turner,
1987).
As with altruism, however, what looks like collectivism
may actually be a subtle form of egoism. Perhaps attention to
group welfare is simply an expression of enlightened self-
interest. After all, if one recognizes that ignoring group needs
and the common good in a headlong pursuit of self-benefit
will only lead to less self-benefit in the long run, then one
may decide to benefit the group as a means to maximize over-
all self-benefit. Appeals to enlightened self-interest are often
used by politicians and social activists trying to encourage
prosocial response to societal needs. They warn of the long-
term consequences for oneself and one’s children of pollution
and squandering natural resources. They remind that if the
plight of the poor becomes too severe, those who are well off
may face revolution. Such appeals seem to assume that col-
lectivism is simply a form of egoism.
The most direct evidence that collectivism is independent
of egoism comes from research by Dawes, van de Kragt, and
Orbell (1990). They examined the responses of individuals
who had been given a choice between allocating money to
themselves or to a group. Allocation to oneself maximized in-
dividual but not group profit, whereas allocation to the group
maximized collective but not individual profit.
Dawes et al. (1990) found that if individuals faced with
this dilemma made their allocation after discussing it with
other members of the group, they gave more to the group
than if they had no prior discussion. Moreover, this effect
was specific to the in-group with whom the discussion oc-
curred; allocation to an out-group was not enhanced. Based
on this research, Dawes et al. claimed evidence for collec-
tivist motivation independent of egoism, arguing that their
procedure ruled out the two most plausible egoistic explana-
tions: (a) enlightened self-interest (by having no future con-
tact and only one allocation round) and (b) socially instilled
conscience (a norm to share, if evoked, should increase shar-
ing with the out-group as well as the in-group). There is rea-
son to doubt, however, that their procedure effectively ruled
out self-rewards and self-punishments associated with con-
science. The research on norms reviewed earlier suggests
that norms can be more refined than Dawes and his cowork-
ers allowed. We may have a norm that says “share with
your buddies” rather than a norm that simply says “share.”
So, although this research is important and suggestive, more
and better evidence is needed to justify the conclusion that
collectivist prosocial motivation is not reducible to egoism.
Principlism: Upholding a Moral Principle
Not only have most moral philosophers argued for the impor-
tance of a prosocial motive other than egoism, but most since
Kant (1724–1804) have shunned altruism and collectivism as
well. They reject appeals to altruism, especially empathy-
induced altruism, because feelings of empathy, sympathy, and
compassion are too fickle and too circumscribed. Empathy is
not felt for everyone in need, at least not to the same degree.
They reject appeals to collectivism because group interest is
bounded by the limits of the group; it may even encourage
doing harm to those outside the group. Given these problems
with altruism and collectivism, moral philosophers have typ-
ically advocated prosocial motivation with an ultimate goal of
upholding a universal and impartial moral principle, such as
justice (Rawls, 1971). We shall call this moral motivation
principlism.
Is acting with an ultimate goal of upholding a moral prin-
ciple really possible? When Kant (1785/1898) briefly shifted
from his analysis of what ought to be to what is, he was
ready to admit that even when the concern we show for
others appears to be prompted by duty to principle, it may
actually be prompted by self-love (pp. 23–24). The goal of
upholding a moral principle may be only an instrumental
goal pursued as a means to reach the ultimate goal of self-
benefit. If so, then principle-based motivation is actually
egoistic.
The self-benefits of upholding a moral principle are
conspicuous. One can gain the social and self-rewards of
being seen and seeing oneself as a good person. One can also
avoid the social and self-punishments of shame and guilt for
failing to do the right thing. As Freud (1930) suggested, soci-
ety may inculcate such principles in the young in order to bri-
dle their antisocial impulses by making it in their best
personal interest to act morally (see also Campbell, 1975).
Alternatively, through internalization (Staub, 1989) or devel-
opment of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976), principles may
come to be valued in their own right and not simply as in-
strumental means to self-serving ends.
The issue here is the same one faced with altruism and
collectivism. We need to know the nature of the underlying
motive. Is the desire to uphold justice (or some other moral
principle) an instrumental goal on the way to the ultimate
goal of self-benefit? If so, this desire is a form of egoism. Is
upholding the principle an ultimate goal, and the ensuing
self-benefits merely unintended consequences? If so, princi-
plism is a fourth type of prosocial motivation, independent of
egoism, altruism, and collectivism.
Recent research suggests that people often act so as to
appear moral while, if possible, avoiding the cost of actually
being moral (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf,
& Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, &
Strongman, 1999). This research also suggests that if moral
motivation exists, it is easily overpowered by self-interest.
Many of us are, it seems, quite adept at moral rationalization.